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Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios:
Divide or Conquer?
Current Draft: 20 February 2013
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic1
The worldwide adoption of competition law is a remarkable
development in economic regulation. More than 120 jurisdictions have
enacted competition laws, and roughly 90 of these have come into being
since 1990.2 Companies accustomed to regarding antitrust rules as the sum
of commands issued by the European Union and the United States now
must account for policies set in countries such as Brazil, China, and India.
In only the past five years, major additions have included the establishment
of a new antimonopoly law in China and a thorough overhaul of India’s
system.3
The attention now given to the formation of antitrust laws globally
has obscured an important characteristic of the institutions entrusted with
their implementation. The agencies established to enforce competition laws
often have mandates that encompass other policy responsibilities. The U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an informative example. The FTC is a
policy conglomerate, a body whose mandate combines antitrust, a wide
range of consumer protection functions (most notably, oversight of
commercial advertising and marketing practices), and an increasingly
important role as the principal U.S. data protection and privacy agency.4

1

Hyman is H. Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law and Professor of Medicine,
University of Illinois. From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade
Commission. Kovacic is Professor at the George Washington University School of Law.
From 2001-2011, he was, at various points, the General Counsel, Commissioner, and
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.
2
On patterns in the adoption of competition laws, see William E. Kovacic, The
Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1019,
1042-43 & n. 82 (2012). One excellent repository of information on the establishment of
new systems is the International Competition Network, whose members include the
competition agencies of roughly 100 jurisdictions. Modern developments in the creation
and implementation of competition systems can be followed on the ICN website, which is
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
3
On the modern competition law reforms in China and India, see Competition Law in
the BRICS Countries (Vassily Rudomino et al. eds., 2012).
4
On the FTC’s diverse mandate, see Federal Trade Commission, The FTC in 2012
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/highlights/2012/ftc-highlights.pdf.
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The FTC’s multi-dimension policy portfolio is the norm among
jurisdictions with competition laws. Over half of the jurisdictions with
competition laws assign to what often is called a “competition agency”
important economic policy functions beyond competition law. For example,
more than thirty jurisdictions rely on a single agency to enforce antitrust
laws and to implement consumer protection statutes (especially measures
that ban false advertising).5 Other countries employ still more elaborate
combinations such as Peru’s INDECOPI (antitrust, consumer protection,
trade, intellectual property, and bankruptcy), Russia’s Federal
Antimonopoly Service (antitrust, advertising, and public procurement), and
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (antitrust, consumer
protection, and regulatory matters involving the telecommunications
sector). Still other countries, such as the Netherlands and Spain, are
considering the formation of new government bodies that would merge the
competition agency with various other regulatory authorities
The specific amalgamation of policy tasks within a single
government body has important consequences for how competition
agencies define their goals, allocate resources, and select programs to fulfill
their duties. The assignment of multiple regulatory tasks can deeply affect a
competition agency’s performance, just as it affects the performance of
other agencies. This issue has attracted little attention in competition policy
circles,6 although public administration scholars (and, to a far more limited
extent, legal academics) have done important work on such issues in other
areas.7
5

Some of the world’s best known competition policy bodies share this design
characteristic, including the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and
Canada’s Competition Bureau.
6
Noteworthy recent exceptions have examined the combination of competition and
consumer protection duties in a single agency. See, e.g., Competition Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Background Documentation for
the Global Forum on Competition (Feb. 21-22, 2008) (collecting materials on “the
interface between competition and consumer policies”); Katalin J. Cseres, Integrate or
Separate – Institutional Design for the Enforcement of Competition Law and Consumer
Law (Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, Working Paper Series 201301, Jan. 2013).
7
An abbreviated list of articles on the subject by legal scholars would include Jody
Freeman & James Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harvard
L. Rev. 1131 (2012); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 Columbia L.
Rev. 746 (2011); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 181 (2011);
Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
Texas L. Rev. 15 (2010); Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice and Public
Law, in Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, D. Farber & A. O’Connell,
eds. (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Dara K. Cohen, MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and
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Despite this gap, there is growing interest among government
agencies in the links between institutional design and agency behavior. In
scholarly commentary and in the work of multilateral organizations such as
the International Competition Network (ICN), there is greater recognition
that the quality of a nation’s competition policy depends crucially on the
effectiveness of the institutions entrusted with the formulation and
implementation of that policy.8 There is little point in discussing what
substantive programs the world’s competition agencies should pursue
without a more careful examination of how they agencies will carry them
out. As we have suggested in other work, the latter inquiry inevitably and
necessarily involves an assessment of institutional design.9
In this article, we continue our analysis of the relationship between
agency design and performance. We illuminate the dynamics that influence
the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and
the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the
specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes can affect agency
performance. We focus on the organization of public competition agencies,
the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev. (2006); Jacob E. Gersen,
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev.
201; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1655 (2006); David A.
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L. J.
955 (2004); Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of
Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 93 (1992).
Public administration scholars and political scientists have spent decades on these
issues. See, e.g., Karen M. Hult, Agency Merger and Bureaucratic Redesign (1987); Beryl
A. Radin & Willis D. Hawley, The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S.
Department of Education (1988); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 212 (2000); Amy B. Zegert, Spying Blind: The CIA,
the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (2007); David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of
Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 19461997 (2003).
The literature on the organization of private firms is, of course, vast. See, e.g., Harold
Demsetz, Ownership, Control, and the Firm (Blackwell 1990).
8
See Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (2011);
Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Anti-Federalism, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (studying impact of
institutional arrangements in shaping outcomes in U.S. antitrust system); William E.
Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building
the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. Telecom. & High
Tech. L. (2010) (describing institutional elements for successful competition and consumer
protection programs).
9
William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: What’s on the
Menu?, 8 European Competition Journal 527 (Dec. 2012). David A. Hyman & William E.
Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life-cycle and The Goals of Competition Law,
Fordham L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2013).
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but our analysis has obvious implications for agency design at other
governmental levels (i.e. both trans-national, and sub-national),10 and to the
design of public and private universities,11 and other nonprofit entities.
Part II provides a historical perspective on the complexities of
designing a public agency. Part III spells out a basic analytical framework
for analyzing the problem of agency design. It then identifies seven factors
that have proven significant in predicting the success and failure (judging
by both durability and popular and academic regard) of any given
combination of functions. Part IV applies our analysis to the FTC and its
combination of competition, consumer protection, and privacy
responsibilities. Part V poses the question whether the correct solution is to
“divide or conquer.” Part VI concludes.
II. Public Agency Design
A.

First Principles

To create a public agency, one must specify at least five major
institutional characteristics: (1) the agency’s relationship to the political
process (the autonomy/accountability tradeoff), (2) the governance
mechanism (management by a single executive or a multi-member board,
(3) location within the government (stand-alone institution or sub-unit of a
larger body), (4) exclusive or shared policy responsibilities; (5) single- or
multi-purpose mandate, and (5) the policy instruments the agency may use
10

See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo’s Deep Reach Into Regulatory Territory
Could Provoke Clash in Albany, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 15, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/nyregion/16cuomo.html?hp (describing proposal to
merge “the state’s Insurance and Banking Departments, along with the Consumer
Protection Board, into a new Department of Financial Regulation. . . [aides] said a single
regulator with broad jurisdiction would be more effective than the patchwork of agencies
charged with protecting New Yorkers from financial fraud. . . It could have the effect of
transforming the superintendent of the new agency into a second “sheriff of Wall Street,”
forcing [Attorney General] Schneiderman, a fellow Democrat with whom Mr. Cuomo has
clashed in the past, to compete for high-profile cases.”)
11
For example, at the University of Illinois, physics is in the College of Engineering,
but chemistry and chemical engineering are in the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences.
Agricultural economics is in the College of Agricultural, Consumer & Environmental
Sciences, but the economics department is in the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences. And,
there are a series of smaller units, institutes, and centers, whose independent status remains
an open issue. See Stewarding Excellence @ Illinois, Academic Unit Reviews at
http://oc.illinois.edu/budget/projectteams.html#unitreviews and Initiatives and Small
Centers, at http://oc.illinois.edu/budget/projectteams.html#smallcenters. Similar issues are
also raised within individual units. Should the law librarian be a member of the law
faculty; the library faculty, or both?
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in carrying out its duties (e.g., data collection and reporting, law
enforcement, business and consumer education, rulemaking, administrative
adjudication, civil and/or criminal authority).12
Our analysis focuses on the fifth of these questions: the assignment
of policy tasks. In a rough sense, we are taking a step toward sketching out
the public administration equivalent of Ronald Coase’s Nature of the
Firm.13 Post-Coase, scholarship has recognized the complex issues raised
by the specification of the boundaries of the firm, and the linkage between
organizational and institutional choices and firm “outputs.” When do firms
carry out some functions themselves, and when do they contract with
others? How do firms decide between contract, acquisition, and joint
venture, when they are not able to do something themselves? Why do firms
enter some product lines and geographic areas, and not others? Are
conglomerates, which participate in multiple independent and unrelated
lines of business, a good idea or not? How important are transaction costs
(i.e., the relative costs of out-sourcing versus internal production) and
product complementarities (i.e., should a manufacturer of mobile phones
also make apps?) in specifying the boundaries of the firm?
How then should we think about the “optimal” boundaries for a
government agency’s substantive responsibility? 14 The polar solutions are
obviously unacceptable: no one creates an agency and fails to give it
something to do, and there are no takers in a modern nation state for a
“Department of Everything.” In between, the dividing lines are less
obvious: how does one decide whether an administrative agency should
have N or (N+1) or (N+10) areas of responsibility? What counts as a
distinct area of responsibility? Does it depend on whether the areas involve
separate substantive bodies of law – and how are the boundaries to be set?
Should the same agency enforce both civil and criminal laws? Should the
agency combine legislative, judicial, and executive functions, or just
amalgamate two of the three – and which two? What arrangement
minimizes the possibility of capture by those being regulated?15 What
arrangement will be most appealing to the legislators who create the agency
in the first place – as well as those charged with oversight and budgetary
authority? If another agency already occupies part of the field, is it better to
12

These and other important institutional choices are set out in Kovacic & Hyman,
supra note 9.
13
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 286 (1937).
14
Some of these parallels are explored in Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 17 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 306
(1999). See also Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi & Schulz, The Two Dimensions of
Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 56 (2006).
15
Cf. Barkow, supra note 7.
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expand capacity at the existing agency, add responsibility to the existing
agency without expanding capacity, or create an entirely new agency?
Should we have multiple agencies responsible for the same general area –
and if so, how should their jurisdiction be defined and enforced? If we want
closer coordination of policy and implementation, should we combine two
(or more) agencies into one, or are other strategies (e.g., creating a
coordinating council or a “czar”) more effective? What are the differing
consequences of creating a new agency, adding new functions to an existing
agency, and reorganizing governmental functions? And so on.
To address these questions, we first examine the forces that
historically have shaped the assignment of regulatory tasks to agencies.
B.
Constructing The Regulatory Portfolio
Unlike business firms, which set their boundaries through
acquisitions, contracts, expansion and contraction, government agencies
acquire substantive responsibilities through one of four paths. The simplest
case is the assignment of specific functions to a particular agency by
deliberate legislative choice. Congress created the FTC in 1914 as an
alternative to the Sherman Act’s prosecutorial model, which vested public
enforcement in an executive body (the Department of Justice) and relied on
the federal courts to adjudicate cases and shape doctrine.16 Congress
intended Section 5 of the FTC Act, which authorized the Commission to
address “unfair methods of competition,” to enable the FTC to follow a
more activist path in enforcing antitrust law and doctrine.17 The agency was
to apply this authority to develop norms of business conduct.
When it is allocated explicitly by statute, regulatory authority may
be shared, concurrent, or exclusive. There are numerous instances where
regulatory authority is shared between a sector-specific agency (e.g., the
Federal Communications Commission in telecommunications) and a
government body with a broader generic mandate to address certain
categories of business transactions (e.g., the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division and the control of mergers). Alternatively, Congress can grant
concurrent authority to two agencies, as is the case with the grant of merger
control authority under the Clayton Act to the DOJ and the FTC.
Agencies can also acquire regulatory or operational authority by
accident or fortuity. As noted above, the original ambit of the FTC was
antitrust law, and there is no evidence that Congress intended for it to play a
16

See Crane, supra note 8, at 13-26 (describing institutional choices underpinning
adoption of the Sherman Act)..
17
15 U.S.C. Section 45. The establishment of the FTC is examined in detail in Marc
Winerman, The Origins of the Federal Trade Commission: Concentration, Cooperation,
Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003).
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role in consumer protection. However, from its first years the FTC used
Section 5 of the FTC Act to respond to complaints from business firms
about their rivals’ deceitful marketing campaigns, Congress explicitly
expanded the FTC’s authority so it could challenge “unfair” and
“deceptive” business practices.18
More broadly, an agency with capabilities originally designed to
serve one purpose may find those capabilities suitable for other analogous
purposes – e.g., “if you’ve got a hammer, why not help other agencies with
nails that need pounding?” Thus, helicopters and warships used to deliver
troops into combat also can be used to assist civilians suffering from natural
disasters, such as earthquakes or floods – explaining why the humanitarian
programs of the Department of Defense have expanded considerably in
recent years.
An agency’s regulatory jurisdiction may also be affected by agency
action in response to changes in business products or technology.19
Consider privacy and data protection policies. Modern advances in
communications and information services technology have dramatically
expanded the ability of firms to collect and use information about consumer
behavior and preferences. The United States does not have an omnibus
privacy and data protection statute. Instead, the U.S. regime consists of
federal and state statutes that regulate specific sectors (e.g., data collection
and use by health care providers) or specific types of transactions (e.g.,
financial services), with regulatory authority dispersed among the agencies
responsible for administering each of these statutes.
The resulting policy vacuum allowed the FTC to emerge as the
leading federal privacy agency, by virtue of several cases it brought against
firms that failed to fulfill promises concerning data protection.20 The FTC
18

The formative legislation is the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). This
evolution is described in Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a
Start-Up Agency: The FTC from 1921-1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 193-95 (2010).
19
We exclude technological developments that cause Congress to act. So, the
emergence of powered flight resulted in a new branch in the Department of Commerce,
which ultimately became the FAA.
20
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Electronics Company Agrees to
Settle Data Security Charges; Breach Compromised Data of Hundreds of Consumers, Feb.
5, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/compgeeks.shtm; Federal Trade Commission,
Iconix Brand Group Settles Charges Its Apparel Web Sites Violated Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act, Oct. 20, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/iconix.shtm;
Federal Trade Commission, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect
Medical and Financial Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays
$2.25 Million to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations, Feb. 18, 2009, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/cvs.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Says Mortgage
Broker Broke Data Security Laws: Dumpster Wrong Place for Consumers’ Personal
Information, Jan. 21, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/navone.shtm.
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also issued reports in December 2010 and March 2012 which proposed a
policy framework for handling privacy issues.21 The Department of
Commerce has sought to play a role into the same policy space, triggering a
behind-the-scenes contest for regulatory primacy, which Congress has not
yet settled.22 In like fashion, the development of broadband networks has
similarly sparked a dispute between the FTC and the FCC over which
agency will oversee this element of the communications sector.
The same dynamic has played out in operational terms within the
DOD on several occasions. Technological development invariably triggers
intense contests to determine which of the uniformed services will control
the deployment of weapons based on the new technology. Consider nuclear
weapons. The Air Force, Army, and Navy all sought to occupy the relevant
policy terrain, devising solutions that were based exclusively on each
service’s area of primary expertise. The Air Force emphasized long-range
bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.23 The Army developed
intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable artillery pieces.
The Navy built ballistic missile submarines and acquired carrier-based
aircraft with the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons. Congressional
appropriations to each service and allocations to particular weapon systems
functioned to indicate the winners and losers of the fight for operational
dominance.
Finally, there is legislative divestiture. Perceived failure (especially
catastrophic failure) can spur Congress to divest some of an agency’s
functions, or fold the entire agency into another institution. So, as detailed
below, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico resulted in a
fundamental reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”)
in the Department of Interior. The melt-down of the financial markets
resulted in the shuttering of the OTS, and transfer of its functions to the
OCC. The devastation of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina
21

Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change (Mar. 2012), at http://www.ftc.gov/os.2012/03/130326/privacyreport.pdf; Federal
Trade Commission, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for Consumers,
Businesses,
and
Policymakers,
Dec.
1,
2010,
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm
22
See Press Release, Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, Dec. 16, 2010, at
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveilspolicy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv.
23
The Air Force was originally unenthusiastic about ballistic missiles, since they
threatened the supremacy of the bomber, which dominated the Air Force culture. When it
became clear that DOD was going to acquire the missiles, the Air Force “faced an awkward
choice: either preserve the culture at the cost of letting the army and navy have what may
turn out to be the weapon of the century, or get on the bandwagon at the cost of modifying
the culture.” Wilson, supra note 7, at 105.
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resulted in a reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security.24
In some instances, divestiture is the result of a planned incubation of
a new regulatory function, and does not necessarily indicate dissatisfaction
with the agency. This was the case with federal securities regulation in the
United States. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the FTC used its consumer
protection authority to challenge deception in the sale of securities. These
cases made the FTC the principal federal entity ensuring honesty in the
securities market. The FTC bolstered this role through hearings and reports
involving the securities industry and the establishment and operation of
public utility holding companies. Although Congress considered assigning
responsibility for securities regulation to the FTC, it ultimately used the
FTC as a transitional platform for the implementation of the 1933 and 1934
securities statutes, until the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
was set up. As part of this plan, James Landis served a short tenure with the
FTC before moving to the new SEC as a commissioner.
The different ways by which agencies acquire (and sometimes lose)
portions of their regulatory portfolio has two distinct implications. First,
agencies seem inevitably to acquire multiple functions and purposes, with
their precise portfolio of responsibilities changing over time. Whether this
multiplicity is the result of deliberate legislative assignment, inadvertence,
seizure of newly created policy terrain that emerges as a result of
technological dynamism and other forms of industry change, or the periodic
divestiture and reallocation of tasks, the reality is that purely single
function/purpose agencies are the exception rather than the rule.
Second, agencies will often have actual or potential rivals for control
of specific policy making functions. Some agencies share policy areas with
other government bodies. In other instances, there is a common boundary,
and agencies periodically contest the location of the property line. In still
other cases (such as when technological change transforms an industry and
its products), the property line shifts. The process is no different than when
a deed defines real estate ownership according to the course of a river. A
change in the course of the river creates predictable disputes over who owns
what.25 Finally, agencies sometimes approach legislators to request
24

Congressional Research Service, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes
After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, Nov. 15, 2006, at
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%
20After%20Katrina.pdf
25
In property, the boundary either moves along with the river (if the change is the
recent of accretion) or remains where it was originally (if the change is the result of
avulsion). This rule explains why although the Mississippi River generally forms the
border between Tennessee and Arkansas (with Arkansas on the east bank, and Tennessee
on the West bank), some of the land on the west bank is in Tennessee, and other land on
the eastern bank is in Arkansas. See State of Arkansas v. State of Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158
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ownership of a previously uninhabited policy area or simply seek to
expropriate another agency’s portfolio. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes
was notorious for his raids on the territory (both real and regulatory) of
other Departments.
Given these dynamics, it would be very useful to know which
factors contribute to the success or failure of particular combinations, and
the associated trade-offs. Part III turns to this issue.
III. Who Should Do What: Seven Criteria
How should we decide who should do what? We offer seven
criteria that reflect our reading of the mix of factors that have historically
influenced agency design, location, and performance.26 We note at the
(1918).
26
Importantly, each factor should be assessed at the level of the agency/department,
rather than any subdivision or bureau within the agency/department. Otherwise, the entire
debate becomes moot, since even facially absurd combinations can look sensible if you
drill down far enough into each agency/department’s organizational chart. See Weisbach
& Nissim, supra note 7, at 958-959 (“Consider, for example, a proposal to have the IRS
run the country’s defense system, replacing the Department of Defense. The proposal is
not as silly as it sounds. It would not mean that bespectacled revenue agents would be
parachuting into the Hindu Kush wearing night goggles, camouflage, and pocket
protectors. Instead, an intelligent Commissioner of Internal Revenue would allow his
employees to specialize. Revenue agents would specialize in reading financial statements
and soldiers would specialize in fighting. Policies under such a proposal might very well
continue much as they do today.”)
With all due respect to Weisbach & Nissim, we think the proposal is exactly as silly as
it sounds. Weisbach & Nissim suggest that the main impediments to the proposal are the
absence of benefits to coordinating tax administration and defense, and the additional costs
of administration and oversight of two dramatically different functions. Id. We suspect
that cultural differences between operators who perform these disparate functions have far
more explanatory power for why we do not observe the imagined combination.
Indeed, the FBI’s repeated failures in the area of domestic intelligence provide an ideal
case study of what happens when one ignores operator culture. See generally Richard
Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence 10, 14-34 (2005). See also Luis Garicano &
Richard Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective, 19 J.
Econ. Persp. 151, 166 (2005) (“If crime fighting requires a geographically decentralized
organization with limited sharing of information and strong individual incentives based on
outputs, but national-security intelligence requires a geographically centralized
organization with extensive sharing of information and careful screening of inputs but lowpowered incentives, the organization’s geographical, incentive, and information-sharing
structure will either be an unhappy compromise or assure poor performance of one of the
two missions.”) The Air Force is currently facing similar difficulties, in trying to adapt its
longstanding officer-pilot based culture to the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. Times M32 (July 8, 2012); David Zucchino, Drone
pilots have a front-row seat on war, from half a world away, L. A. Times (Feb. 21, 2010);
Rachel Martin, Drone Pilots: The Future of Aerial Warfare, NPR Nov. 29, 2011 at
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outset that the factors are “squishy,” inter-related, and are framed at a high
level of generality. We offer them in the spirit of Professors David
Weisbach and Jacob Nissim: even “relatively crude ideas. . . can help
policymakers muddle through the problems they face.”27
A. Evaluative Criteria
1. Policy Coherence
A fundamental question posed by a combination of policy duties is
policy coherence: how related and consistent are the functions that will
reside in the same agency? Do the functions engage the agency in the
pursuit of a single set of internally consistent goals, or do the multiple
functions command the agency to accomplish inconsistent or unrelated
objectives?
In economic terms, one can ask whether are the functions to be
combined are complements or substitutes. If they are complements, the
combination has the potential to result in synergies and efficiencies; if they
are substitutes, the combination is unlikely to result in synergies and
efficiencies, and may actually degrade overall performance if it gives rise to
internal disagreements over which function should be given primacy.
Stated broadly, synergies and efficiencies are more likely to result if there
are commonalities among the functions, whether they are derived from a
common client population or type of regulated entity, temporal or physical
commonalities (including but not limited to common inputs and/or outputs),
or even just a shared intellectual framework regarding means and ends.
To be sure, the level of generality at which policy coherence is
assessed can result in radically different organizational outcomes. For
example, in 1930, the Veterans Administration (“VA”) was created by
uniting three bureaus — the Veterans’ Bureau (which was itself created in
1921 by combining programs offered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance,
the Public Health Service and the Federal Board of Vocational Education),
the Bureau of Pensions (located in the Department of the Interior) and the
National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. The common element of
these combinations was the nature of the client population (veterans), even
though the nature of the services being delivered to the client population
varied tremendously (e.g., pensions, health care services, education, and
housing/nursing home care). But the VA does not run all programs for
which veterans qualify; if a veteran is homeless and also has substance
http://www.npr.org/2011/11/29/142858358/drone-pilots-the-future-of-aerial-warfare
27
Weisbach & Nissim, supra note 7, at 997.
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abuse problems, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) is responsible for the veteran’s housing issues, and the VA is
responsible for the substance abuse issues.28
Further, Congress need not organize services around client
populations. For Native Americans, Congress focused instead on the nature
of the underlying services being delivered. Accordingly, it allocated
responsibility for native lands and native education to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (in the Department of Interior), while responsibility for health care
services rendered to the same population was vested in the Indian Health
Service (in the Department of Health & Human Services).
Of course, policy coherence is not necessarily of the highest priority
– which explains why some Departments are little more than a collection of
odds and ends. Consider the Department of Interior, which was created in
1849 by combining the General Land Office (from the Department of the
Treasury), the Patent Office (from the Department of State), the Indian
Affairs Office (from the War Department) and the military pension offices
in the War and Navy Departments.29 Interior’s authority subsequently
expanded to cover such functions as the census, regulation of territorial
governments, exploration of the western United States, management of the
jail and water systems in the District of Columbia, management of
hospitals, universities, and public parks, and the colonization of freed slaves
in Haiti.30 Not surprisingly, “serious observers and satirists alike regularly
decried an absence of unifying purpose in the seemingly disparate
collection of offices,”31 and Interior was widely described as “the
Department of Everything Else” and the “Great Miscellany.”32 Less kindly
disposed commentators described it as “a slop bucket for executive
fragments,” and a “hydra-headed monster.”33 John C. Calhoun predicted
that “everything upon the face of God’s earth will go into the Home
Department.”34
The Department of Commerce, which houses bureaus responsible
for the census, patents and trademarks, weather forecasts, and weights and
standards, has many of the same difficulties. Former Secretary of
28

David Brooks, What Government Does, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011.
Department of Interior History, available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/history.html
30
Id.
31
Robert M. Utley & Barry Mackintosh, The Department of Everything Else:
Highlights
of
Interior
History
(1989),
available
at
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/utley-mackintosh/interior2.htm
32
Id.
33
Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman Vilas, Doctrinaire Democrat (Madison, Wisc.,
1954), pp. 134,139.
34
Henry B. Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior, 16 AM.
HISTORICAL REV. 751, 768 (1911).
29
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Commerce William Daley observed that because the Department of
Commerce includes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the secretary of Commerce “spent 60 percent of his time dealing with
fish.”35
This dynamic can also become self-reinforcing; the less coherent the
combination of functions in a Department to begin with, the easier it
becomes to add the next unrelated function or functions. Not surprisingly,
some departments have become little more than a dumping ground (or less
charitably, a rubbish bin) for bureaus with dissimilar portfolios.
Even if the purposes are related, if they are at odds with one another
the combination can lead to schizophrenia, if not outright paralysis.36
Combining the proposed Department of Peace and Nonviolence and the
Department of Defense is unlikely to be a good strategy, regardless of ones
position on the optimal budget for either department.37 An agency
responsible for both antitrust and trade will have to reconcile the belief that
low prices are generally good (antitrust) with the belief that low prices of
imported goods are generally bad (anti-dumping authority). An agency
charged with the promotion of trade (U.S. Trade Representative) will not be
a good partner for an agency predisposed to regard trade as dumping
(International Trade Commission). An agency charged with the protection
of workers (i.e., the Department of Labor) is unlikely to be a good
combination with an agency charged with the promotion of business (i.e.,
the Department of Commerce) – making it understandable why this
particular combination only lasted a few years, after which the Department
of Commerce and Labor was split in two. When President Johnson
proposed to recombine these two departments in 1963 and again in 1964,
the proposal went nowhere.
Other examples of such difficulties are easy to find. Between 1967
and 1974, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was part of the
Department of Transportation (DOT).
NTSB was charged with
investigating every civil aviation accident and all significant highway,
marine, railroad, pipeline, and hazardous-materials accidents. In 1974,
35

Jim Kuhnhnen, Commerce Cuts Coming in Obama’s Reorganization, AP, Jan, 29,
2011, at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12792513
36
We focus on inconsistencies in ends or goals, but there can also be inconsistencies in
preferred means, even when there is agreement on ends, at least at a high level of
generality.
37
See Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act, H.R. 808, 110th Cong. (2007). The
Department of Peace was to include offices of peace education and training, domestic and
international peace activities, technology, arms control and disarmament, peaceful
coexistence and nonviolent conflict resolution, and human and economic rights. But see
P.J. O’ROURKE, GIVE WAR A CHANCE (2002) “the Marine Corps does more to promote
world peace than all the Ben & Jerry’s ice cream ever made.”)
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Congress spun NTSB off from DOT in 1974 because it concluded NTSB
could not perform its investigatory functions properly if it was part of a
department also responsible for regulating and promoting transportation.38
A similar dynamic explains the separation in 1974 of the Atomic Energy
Commission (responsible for encouraging the use of nuclear power and
regulating safety) into the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ultimately merged into the Department of Energy, and
charged with promoting the use of nuclear power) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (regulating safety).39
Similarly, until it was reorganized in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, the Minerals Management Service in the Department of
Interior was “charged both with collecting revenue generated by oil and gas
drilling to fund the government, and with approving the permits that
generate that revenue. . . [leaving the MMS] torn between whether to be a
regulator or friend to industry.”40 The Bureau of Land Management (in the
Department of Interior) is responsible for mining and grazing on federal
lands, but it also houses the National Landscape Conservation System,
whose priorities are, to say the least, quite different.
When Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913, its original
mandate was to maintain price stability (i.e., to combat inflation and
deflation). Congress subsequently added to this mandate. Since 1977 the
Federal Reserve is charged with “promot[ing] effectively the goals of
38

This background is recounted in National Transportation Safety Board, History of
the National Transportation Safety Board, at http://ntsb.gov/about/history.html.
39
This split solved one problem but created another. The NRC is now far more
susceptible to capture than was the case when it was part of a larger entity with a more
diversified portfolio. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 465 (1999); Barkow, supra
note 7.
40
Mark Jaffee & David Olinger, Tracking down Minerals Management Service’s
dysfunctional history of drilling oversight, DENVER POST, June 6, 2010, at
http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_15236764. In response to these criticisms, and
the firestorm of Congressional disapproval that followed the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
Secretary of the Interior Salazar reorganized MMS into three separate entities: the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, which is responsible for “the sustainable development of
the Outer Continental Shelf’s conventional and renewable energy resources, including
resource evaluation, planning, and other activities related to leasing;” the Bureau of Safety
and Environmental Enforcement, which is “responsible for ensuring comprehensive
oversight, safety, and environmental protection in all offshore energy activities;” and the
Office of Natural Resources Revenue, which is “responsible for the royalty and revenue
management function including the collection and distribution of revenue, auditing and
compliance, and asset management.” Press Release, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three
Conflicting Missions, May 19, 2010, at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-ConflictingMissions.cfm
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maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest
rates.” There is an obvious inconsistency between these goals; if price
stability were the only priority, a zero interest rate would be the relevant
target, but maximum employment might require a higher interest rate.41
The dual mandate also makes the actions of the Federal Reserve less
predictable, harder to assess critically, and more susceptible to political
interference.42
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has encountered
similar difficulties, since it is charged with “fostering air commerce,” as
well as safety.43 According to a former DOT Inspector General, the FAA
has generally responded by favoring commerce at the expense of safety.44
When the issue attracted public attention, Congress responded by modifying
the dual mandate, but the change had limited impact on the culture of the
FAA.45
Similar conflicting mandates also help explain why the problems
with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac got as bad as they did. As formerTreasury Secretary Lawrence Summers noted, “the illusion that the
companies were doing virtuous work made it impossible to build a political
case for serious regulation. When there were social failures the companies
always blamed their need to perform for the shareholders. When there were
business failures it was always the result of their social obligations.”46
Stated more broadly, a department with multiple mandates can come up
41

Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Communications, Nov. 14, 2007, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071114a.htm
(“Were price stability the only objective mandated for the Federal Reserve, the FOMC
presumably would strive to achieve zero inflation. . . But under the Federal Reserve's dual
mandate, the determination of the appropriate long-run inflation rate must take account of
factors that may affect the efficient functioning of the economy at very low rates of
inflation. . . [t]hus, the (properly measured) long-run inflation rate that best promotes the
dual mandate is likely to be low but not zero.”)
42
George F. Will, The Trap of the Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 2010 (“The Fed cannot perform such a fundamentally political function and
forever remain insulated from politics. Only repeal of the dual mandate can rescue the Fed
from the ruinous - immediately to its reputation; eventually to its independence - role as the
savior of the economy, or of any distressed sector (e.g., housing) that clamors for lower
interest rates.”)
43
MARY SCHIAVO FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 51 (1997).
44
Id. at 65 (“If outsiders viewed the FAA as encumbered by a divided loyalty and
hamstrung by its dual mandate, the FAA didn’t seem to share that confusion. The
tombstone mindset made plain its loyalty to the cost-conscious interests of the aviation
industry.”)
45
Id. at 203, 206.
46
Lawrence Summers, You Want Creative Capitalism? Try This, 195, 196 in
CREATIVE CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION WITH BILL GATES, WARREN BUFFETT, AND
OTHER ECONOMIC LEADERS (Michael Kinsley & Conor Clarke, eds.) (2008).
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with a plausible justification for almost any decision under the sun.
One should not overstate the necessity for consistency within a
single department or agency, since sound policy-making usually requires
the balancing of competing interests. Consider banking regulation, where
solvency must be balanced against consumer protection. If solvency and
consumer protection are handled by distinct agencies, each will focus on the
areas within their respective domains, and either discount or ignore entirely
the other’s area of responsibility. Yet, that approach is a recipe for regular
battles between the agencies as to which should prevail on an issue that
implicates both sets of interests. A decision balancing the relevant
considerations will eventually have to be made by someone – either within
a single agency, if both functions are combined, or at a higher level if the
two (or more) involved agencies are unable to agree amongst themselves.
Obviously, the mission and location of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), and the reorganization of MMS raise these issues in a
very concrete way.47
The problem gets stickier when the interests that must be balanced
fall in different legal domains, or are incommensurable. Consider the risks
(whether real or hypothetical) posed to endangered species and the general
population by military training and technology.48 If DOD is put in charge
of deciding whether military training/technology is more important than the
risks created by such training/technology, it will predictably focus on the
benefits, and decide accordingly. If Interior or EPA get to decide the same
dispute, they will predictably focus on the risks of training/technology, and
47

The press release announcing the reorganization of MMS highlights the benefits of
avoiding agencies with conflicting missions – but it says nothing about the necessity of
integrating the conflicting decisions that will result from separate agencies. See Press
Release, supra note 40 (“‘The Minerals Management Service has three distinct and
conflicting missions that – for the benefit of effective enforcement, energy development,
and revenue collection – must be divided,’ said Secretary Salazar. ‘The reorganization I am
ordering today is the next step in our reform agenda and will enable us to carry out these
three separate and equally-important missions with greater effectiveness and
transparency.’”)
48
See, e.g., State of Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 736 F.2nd 438 (7th Cir. 1984) (dispute
over whether the Department of Defense was required to prepare a supplemental
environmental impact statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act with
respect to construction of a new extremely low frequency (“ELF”) submarine
communications system based in Michigan and upgrading of ELF system in Wisconsin
when new information was available on the biological effects of ELF). A similar dispute
raged over the use of Vieques Island as a bombing range by the U.S. Navy. See, e.g.,
Edward Walsh, Despite protest, Navy resumes bombing exercises on Vieques/Training
interrupted briefly -- 14 arrests, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2001 (“The Navy resumed practice
bombing on the small Puerto Rican island of Vieques yesterday, intensifying a debate that
has pitted what the Navy says is the vital need for realistic training exercises against the
health concerns of the island's population and the Puerto Rican government.”)
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decide accordingly. Similarly, if there is an environmental issue on a
military base, DOD and EPA are likely to have very different assessments
of the seriousness of the problem.49 The dispute over the Keystone XL
pipeline provides another example of this phenomenon; the Department of
State found no material environmental problems with the project, and
Secretary of State Clinton stated that she was “inclined” to approve it – but
EPA had a dramatically different perspective on the environmental risks,
and was viewed by project supporters as a “de facto ally of
environmentalists.”50 Similar dynamics play out across other domains,
including the balancing of environmental protection against nuclear energy,
balancing industrial development (and the associated employment) against
population health and environmental justice claims, and so on.51
Thus, which agency is the “decider” will significantly affect the
outcome of any given dispute, as well as whether particular circumstances
count as “disputes.” Stated differently, despite the rhetoric that typically
surrounds reorganization, the issue is not just about process efficiencies – it
is also about outcomes.
2. Credibility/Branding
49

Lyndsey Layton, Pentagon Fights EPA on Pollution Cleanup, WASH. POST, June 30,
2008,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901977.html.
50
See Secretary Clinton speaks about Innovation and American Leadership,
http://newsblaze.com/story/20101017130926stat.nb/topstory.html (“[W]e've not yet signed
off on it. But we are inclined to do so and we are for several reasons - going back to one of
your original questions - we're either going to be dependent on dirty oil from the Gulf or
dirty oil from Canada.”); Elana Schor, Canada-U.S. Oil Pipeline Poses Few Environmental
Risks -- State Dept., N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2011 (“Among the entities that now could
scrutinize the document during a 90-day comment period are other federal agencies -including EPA, which called for more in-depth review of the project's footprint in June
comments that called an earlier EIS ‘insufficient.’ That stance has led some green groups
to look to EPA to expose any potential flaws they might see in the final EIS, while some of
the pipeline's supporters view the agency as a de facto ally of environmentalists. Robert
Jones, vice president of the Keystone pipeline system at TransCanada, said earlier this
month that ‘I want to be responsive" to EPA's concerns, but "the frustration I have is that I
might as well be talking to NRDC or the Sierra Club.’”)
51
See HOWARD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITIONS AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF
FEDERAL ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1998) (“If agencies are to work together harmoniously,
they must share at least some community of interests about basic goals. . . Senator Frank
Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park Service and the Army Corps of
Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated activities. Park service officials
complained that the engineers drained the Everglades National Park almost dry in their
efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glade country for agriculture. The Army
Corps of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and flood control for the
people.”)
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A public agency’s “brand” conveys a message about the agency’s
priorities and aims to both internal and external constituencies. The brand
can become diluted and/or confused if the agency has too many
responsibilities, or if the responsibilities are not complementary and
consistent. For agency insiders, a diluted/confused brand can create
confusion about what projects ought to be selected, what theory ought to
motivate the pursuit of individual matters, and the relative priority and
seriousness of particular projects/matters.52 A diluted/confused brand can
also affect the agency’s decision rules: personnel working for an agency
with a diluted/confused brand will find it easier to adopt amorphous
standards and employ ad hoc reasoning when justifying their decisions.53 A
diluted/confused brand can also distract the agency from its core mission,
and may even affect the culture of the agency. Those who interact with an
agency with a diluted/confused brand are more likely to complain that it
operates inconsistently and unreliably.
These branding dynamics also influence agency credibility. The
better the reputation an agency has with Congress and congressional
staffers, the more likely it is to receive adequate funding, and not be
subjected to routine second-guessing/reversal. The better the reputation an
agency has with courts, the greater the deference it is likely to receive for its
decisions. The better the reputation an agency has with the parties it
regulates, the more likely it is to be able to work out a cost-effective
solution in a timely way, without resorting to full-blown adversarial
proceedings.
Although credibility obviously depends on multiple factors,
including the particulars of the involved agencies, and their respective
histories and past decisions, the bundling of functions influences an
agency’s reservoir of political capital. Regulatory bodies are continually
52

Cf. Wilson, supra note 7, at 55-59 (describing how the Economic Cooperation
Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency were profoundly affected by the
personnel they acquired from other agencies, given the open-ended nature of the original
mandate (i.e. the brand) for each agency). Indeed, as Wilson concisely observes, “if a new
agency has ambiguous goals, the employees’ prior experience will influence how its tasks
get defined.”) Id. at 55.
53
See Summers, supra note 46; Janice Revell, Interview with John Taylor, Money
Magazine 93, 96 (Aug. 2012) (“The Fed needs to focus on a single goal of long-run price
stability. We should remove the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and stable
prices, which was put into effect in the 1970s. From 2003 to 2005, the Fed held interests
rates too low for too long. A primary reason was its concern that raising rates would
increase unemployment. . . More recently, the Fed has cited concerns over employment to
to justify its interventions, including quantitatitive easing. Removing the dual mandate
would take away that excuse.”) (emphasis supplied).
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engaged in a process of accumulating and spending political capital.
Combining a function that generates political capital surpluses with a
function that runs political capital deficits may give an agency greater
ability to perform deficit-prone functions that are important to the larger
economy. Conversely, an agency whose portfolio of responsibilities
ensures that it always runs a political deficit is an agency that has no
constituency. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is
a case study of precisely this phenomenon.54
Such considerations help explain why agencies sometimes resist the
addition of new responsibilities, even when acceptance would result in a
greater budget and more visibility. For several decades, the FBI vigorously
resisted attempts to expand its jurisdiction to encompass federal drug
laws.55 The State Department did not want the United States Information
Agency and the Agency for International Development.56 On at least two
occasions, the Secret Service declined requests from the CIA to spy on
visiting foreign dignitaries.57
A similar dynamic explains why agencies sometimes try to get rid of
responsibilities that senior agency personnel believe detract from the
agency’s core mission. In 1973 and again in 1974, the Department of
Agriculture tried to get rid of responsibility for the Food Stamp program,
since it viewed itself as being in the “food business” – not the “welfare
business.”58 As these examples indicate, agency personnel have complex
interests and incentives, and do not simply seek to grow their domains and
budgets.
Another factor affecting an agency’s brand and credibility is its
susceptibility to capture. In general, the broader an agency’s portfolio, the
harder it is to capture, since all of the covered industries must bid against
one another to capture the regulator. This dynamic may raise the price of
capture so high as to make it no longer cost-effective for any given industry
or market participant to attempt to do so. Thus, the Interstate Commerce
54

See Susan E. Dudley, Lessons Learned, Challenges Ahead: Is There a Constituency
for OIRA, REGULATION 7-8 (Summer, 2009) (“OIRA’s mandate is to advance the general
public interest. . . Hence there is no concentrated constituency for OIRA.”)
55
Wilson, supra note 7, at 180 (“For years members of Congress tried to persuade J.
Edgar Hoover that the FBI should take over federal responsibility for investigating drug
trafficking.”)
56
Id.
57
Marc Ambinder, Inside the Secret Service, HARPERS, Mar. 2011, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/03/inside-the-secret-service/8390/
(“over the past 10 years, the CIA had asked the service on at least two occasions to help
develop intelligence on a visiting foreign leader—that is, essentially, to spy on the very
person it was assigned to protect. Both times, the service refused.”)
58
Wilson, supra note 7, at 108-109.
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Commission (ICC) was much harder for a single industry to capture,
because it covered both trucking and railroads, compared to the dynamic in
financial services, where Congress allocated responsibility for regulating
insurers, banks, and securities to entirely separate regulators. (We leave to
the side the question of whether the ICC performed well or poorly; our
point is simply about the relative likelihood of capture). The EPA presents
a similar dynamic; because it is responsible for pollution of the air, water,
and land, it is harder for polluters in a single industry to capture the agency.
To be sure, the prospect of capture may be the whole point of creating an
agency in the first place.
3.

Capacity/Capability

Agency resources are scarce, just like everything else. Assigning N
+1 functions to an agency that only has the resources (whether measured by
headcount, band-width, or credibility) to handle N responsibilities is asking
for trouble. Stated differently, an agency with multiple discrete functions
can easily find itself with too many things to do, relative to the pool of
talent that it has available. One needs a critical mass of talent to do any one
thing well; to do multiple things well requires both sufficient capacity and
continuous fine-tuning of the agency’s allocation of resources.59 Absent
such conditions, agencies will necessarily give superficial treatment to areas
that, at any particular point in time, are deemed less central to the agency’s
mission. Agency employees are not stupid, and will respond accordingly,
sorting themselves to work in particular areas – with their choices dictated
by their ambition and enthusiasm. The result is that some areas will
flourish and others will languish – even if budgets keep pace with new
responsibilities (which they almost never do).
Congress already has a tendency to assign new responsibilities to
existing agencies without providing much in the way of additional funding.
For example, expansions in the responsibilities of the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) have not been accompanied by similar expansions
in funding.60 To be sure, there will always be competition for resources,
59

Wilson, supra note 7, at 378 (“[W]e live in a country that despite its baffling array
of rules and regulations and the insatiable desire of some people to use government to
rationalize society still makes it possible to get drinkable water instantly, put through a
telephone call in seconds, deliver a letter in a day, and obtain a passport in a week. . . One
can stand on the deck of an aircraft carrier during night flight operations and watch two
thousand nineteen-year-old boys faultlessly operate one of the most complex organizational
systems ever created. There are not many places where all this happens. It is astonishing
that it can be made to happen at all.”)
60
See, e.g., Ladd Wiley & Steven A. Grossman, Does FDA Have Enough Funding to
Fulfill its Critical Role in Protecting the Public Health? 1 FDLI FOOD AND DRUG POLICY
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regardless of how many functions an agency performs. But, combining
functions within a single department does not eliminate the problem.
Instead, it is merely shifted to a less transparent setting for resolution.
The funding/resource allocation problem noted above will
necessarily be less visible if it is resolved within a single agency. The
agency will present a funding request that reflects its internal resolution of
the budgetary fight, and its assessment of its overall priorities. The same
dynamic applies to the allocation of effort within the agency. Barring a
whistle-blower, external constituencies will never learn the details of who
wanted what – and what is no longer being done with the same enthusiasm,
if at all. If the funding debate involved multiple agencies, there would be a
higher degree of transparency, since each agency would be required to make
its case individually.61
Capacity is not the same thing as capability. Capability determines
whether an agency has the tools to make good decisions, and does so. An
agency with enforcement responsibilities first needs the statutory authority
to exercise its will, and an adequate set of remedies with which to enforce
compliance. Once it is so armed, it will predictably make two types of
errors: Type I (intervening when it should not, or a false-positive), and Type
II (not intervening when it should, or a false negative). The institutional
design question is whether an agency with multiple (and potentially
competing) functions and purposes is likely to make more or fewer mistakes
– and perhaps, of which type. In principle, both types of error are equally
problematic; it is the overall frequency of error that matters. In practice,
false positives are viewed as more problematic than false negatives, since
they are more visible, and the aggrieved constituency can readily mobilize
in opposition. Such issues should be considered in deciding how to allocate
regulatory authority.
A related point concerns the agency’s own ambitions. Expansion of
the agency’s substantive mandate can degrade capability. As the agency’s
authority grows, its leadership and staff may acquire an exaggerated sense
of the institution’s ability to perform effectively, and pay less attention to
whether the agency’s commitments match its capabilities.
These
circumstances can result in agency leadership “over-promising and underdelivering.”
FORUM (2011).
61
To be sure, the budgeting process is not fully transparent. If the Administration
decides not to include funding for an initiative that agency personnel would like to pursue,
Congress may never learn of that fact. Agency personnel are not allowed to request from
Congress a budgetary allocation in excess of the amount in the Administration’s budget –
which can lead to considerable frustration during Congressional hearings, if the recent fight
over the funding of the Consumer Product Safety Commission is any indication.
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A second problem arises from legislative perceptions that the
breadth of an agency’s mandate gives it the capability to address all
troublesome phenomena. The more expansive an agency’s mandate, the
more likely it is that Congress will turn to the agency to address
developments that do not fit neatly elsewhere – even if those problems do
not actually play to an agency’s strengths. Thus, an agency with expansive
powers becomes a default option for handling the latest problem, regardless
of whether the agency’s actual capacity and capabilities supply effective
means for achieving a good solution.
More broadly, inadequate capacity forces a bureau or agency to set
priorities (and accordingly, triage the issues in its regulatory portfolio).
Some issues will receive close attention, while others will only get attention
in response to complaints or crises. Such triage is necessary if the agency is
to keep its head above water, but it means that “law in action” is quite
different than “law on the books.” It is also a recipe for recriminations and
oversight hearings when an issue on the losing end of the triage process
blows up in the face of the agency. The FDA’s attempts to do both food
and drug safety provide an obvious example of how this sequence can play
out.62
Capability is also influenced by the degree to which agency
personnel self-critically assess both means and ends. When multiple
agencies share responsibility for a particular area, there is a feedback loop
for surfacing and resolving disagreements regarding such matters. When a
single agency has sole responsibility, and seeks to handle such matters
internally, the risks of groupthink and tunnel vision increase. Conversely,
the increased transparency that results from two agencies disagreeing on
such matters lowers these risks – particularly if those on the “losing” side of
the dispute are willing to leak the information, as is often the case.
For example, the Departments of State and the CIA have been at
odds over the use of drones in Pakistan. In one recent incident, the
ambassador sought to postpone a strike for what he believed to be good
reasons, but was overruled by the CIA director, for what he believed to be
good reasons.63 Reasonable people can disagree as to whether the CIA or
the Department of State had the better of the argument in this particular
case, but it seems clear that the dispute was much less likely to come to
62

AP, Risks of tainted food rise as inspections drop, Feb. 26, 2007, at
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light if the issue was being decided by (and within) a single entity than
when two agencies/departments with different views were involved.
4. Resilience: Is the Assignment of Functions Adaptable and
Sustainable?
Statutes routinely allocate jurisdiction according to the technology
used to supply a product or the status of the organization that provides the
service. What happens when the character of the industry is altered by
technological change or the emergence of new categories of suppliers of the
sector’s goods or services? As suggested earlier, regulatory jurisdictional
boundaries can shift over time in much the way that the movement of a
river will sometimes alter rights in real property.64 When such changes take
place, multiple agencies may seek to exercise authority by arguing that the
reconfigured industry falls within their purview. A sustainable assignment
of functions will be able to adapt to such changes; a non-sustainable
assignment will not – making bureaucratic warfare between the rival
agencies a very real possibility.65
One obvious example is the almost decade-long dispute between the
SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) over
products that arose at the interface of regulatory authority of these two
agencies. The SEC regulates securities; the CFTC regulates futures
contracts. But what happens when a futures contract is for the delivery of
securities? The SEC took the logical (and self-interested) position that a
futures contract involving a security was subject to its jurisdiction. The
CFTC took the logical (and self-interested) position that it had exclusive
jurisdiction over all futures contracts. Both agencies pointed to their
enabling legislation. When the CFTC approved the Chicago Board of
Trade’s trading of futures contracts on GNMA certifications and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s trading of futures contracts on T-bills, the
SEC took the position that it might view such trading as illegal,
notwithstanding the CFTC’s approval. The Chicago Board of Trade
brought a lawsuit against the SEC, challenging its assertion of jurisdiction.66
The SEC also brought several lawsuits challenging the CFTC’s assertion of
64

Whether the property right moves with the course of the water depends on whether
the movement was the result of avulsion (no change in property right) or accretion (change
in property right).
65
Cf. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM
JURISDICTION 2 (1997) (“As with nations and hunting groups, poorly defined boundaries
lead to wasteful skirmishes.”)
66
Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982)
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exclusive jurisdiction.67 The dispute was finally settled with a negotiated
agreement between the two agencies, which was ultimately enacted into
formal law.
The regulation of financial services routinely raises this problem,
because regulatory authority is generally tied to the type of entity being
regulated, rather than the type of product being offered. Consider the
comments of a Federal Deposition Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
associate director, noting the complexities of determining whether a
particular depository institution was indeed a bank:
First, you have to figure out, what in the hell is a bank?
And what is the intent of deposit insurance? It’s a far cry
from when they set it up. A typical commercial bank was
one that made agricultural loans, commercial loans, and held
demand deposits. . . Congress had in mind what a bank was. .
. Now you may have a furniture company and they may say
“we will sell a lot of couches on credit, and we borrow
money to do that. We could [finance the credit] with
commercial paper, but by and large we use a commercial
bank for our needs. . . Why don’t I establish a bank and get
insurance. . . I could go out and sell CDs. . . Then I’ve got
back up and my financing rates go way down. . . Now I am a
lender for couches; instead of selling the loans to the bank or
borrowing, I just put the loans on my books.” Well that isn’t
what anyone was thinking of or imagined at first. . . They get
deposit insurance and they play on the federal guarantee to
reduce interest costs and financing.68
Such border disputes can easily trigger a turf war between agencies. These
dynamics are also affected by the demand side, as firms maneuver to
“choose” their regulator.
An adaptive regulatory framework would have clearly allocated
regulatory authority over a particular area to a specific regulatory agency -instead of forcing personnel at multiple agencies to spend considerable time
and effort disputing the allocation of responsibility. Various strategies are
available to proactively address adaptability, but to a considerable degree,
Congress only examines such matters in response to train wrecks and crises,
in which perceived and/or real failures in the regulatory process give rise to
reassessment. Dodd-Frank presents an obvious example of the end game of
67

SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp 1029 (D. Ill. 1976).
68
ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, CHECKING ON BANKS: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THREE FEDERAL AGENCIES 126-127 (1996).
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this dynamic – albeit one that did not provide a resilient solution to the
broader problem it sought to address, with the exception of creating the
CFPB.
Resilience is obviously not as important as some of the other factors,
because problems will emerge, if at all, over time. But, the absence of
properly defined jurisdictional boundaries will eventually lead to border
wars between agencies/departments, and turf wars among congressional
committees. Creating an adaptable and sustainable grant of regulatory
authority helps reduce the amount of time spent on such activities.
5.

Internal Organizational Cohesion

When discrete functions are combined in a single agency or
department, the result is usually the creation of separate operating units for
each function. As individual operating units become more specialized and
autonomous, they quickly develop norms, goals, and priorities that
predictably differ from other units in the same agency or department. Over
time, this process results in units being staffed by personnel whose interests,
training, and abilities focus narrowly on the work of their unit and have
little understanding of the backgrounds and activities of other units
underneath the same institutional roof. Predictably enough, each individual
operating unit starts to see the other units as rivals for prestige, headcount,
and budgetary resources.
This rivalry can be beneficial if it results in synergies that serve the
larger aims of the agency. Conversely, the rivalry will be destructive if it
manifests itself in credit-claiming or other measures designed to enhance
the visibility of the operating unit as an end in itself. The third possibility is
there will be neither beneficial nor destructive rivalry; individual units will
simply not acknowledge the existence of the other units. Issues of culture
and history loom large in determining which of these three outcomes will
result.
To be sure, such difficulties are likely to arise whether we are
dealing with a single agency or multiple agencies that are expected to
coordinate their efforts. And, such difficulties can exist within a single
department: consider the intra-service rivalries in the U.S. Air Force
(bomber v. fighter pilots) and the U.S. Navy (surface navy v. aviators v.
submarines).69 But, matters are often much worse across divisions within a
single agency or department, such as the legendary conflicts between the
rival military services contained within a single Department of Defense:
69

More colloquially, these are referred to as the brown shoe, black shoe, and felt shoe
Navy. Wilson, supra note 7, at 106.
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It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy
at that time were vying for who would have the primary
mission of the strategic defense of the country. The Air
Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy was advocating
its ballistic missile submarines and putting nuclear capable
aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. The debate was heated and
there was not enough money to do both. The future missions
of both services were at stake. An Air Force Colonel was
briefing General LeMay on the Soviet threat versus the
strategic requirements funded in the budget. The Colonel
told General LeMay that the Russians, our enemy, were
capable of . . . and at that point General LeMay stopped him.
LeMay was quoted as saying, “The Russians are our
adversary. The Navy is our enemy.”70

LeMay’s assessment echoes in another story of institutional narrowmindedness that circulates in the folklore of World War II. In this story, a
journalist interviews a Marine Corps pilot after VJ Day in 1945. The
exchange goes like this:
Journalist: “What was the enemy like in the Pacific?”
Marine Corps pilot: “Terrible.”
Journalist: “What do you mean, terible?”
Marine Corps pilot. “They were savage, merciless, and
relentless. Every time we thought we had them beat, they’d do
something despicable and underhanded, and we’d have to start over
again.”
Journalist: “It must have been a relief to hear that Japan had
surrendered.”
Marine Corps pilot: “Japan? I was talking about the U.S. Navy!”
Other examples of inter-service attitudes (and their consequences)
are not hard to find. The Air Force is responsible for close air support of
ground operations, but, air force culture is “based on flying highperformance fighters and long-range bombers, especially the latter.”71 Not
surprisingly, the Air Force historically gave “minimal attention to close air
70

John Melchner, Managing the Budget Process, J. PUB. INTEGRITY 11, 13
(Fall/Winter, 1998), available at http://www.ignet.gov/randp/jpifw98.pdf.
71
Wilson, supra note 7, at 186.
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support and buys just enough attack aircraft to protect its claim to the close
air support mission. Meanwhile, the Army, unsure that it can rely on Air
Force support when it is needed, purchases a vast fleet of attack helicopters
which, while more expensive than attack planes and potentially far more
vulnerable, can be placed under direct Army command.”72 When U.S.
armed forces invaded Grenada in 1983, there were problems with the
interoperability of communications systems between Marines in the north
and Army Rangers in the south: “since their radios could not communicate
with the ships of the Independence battle group, Army radiomen were
forced to send their request for fire support to Fort Bragg which in turn
relayed them by satellite to the ships.”73
Stated more broadly, the coordination of functions and
responsibilities will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus
are combined into a single department.74 Indeed, the more each bureau
attempts to build esprit de corps and signal that it is truly elite, the less
likely “joint-ness” will result. Such dynamics have long complicated
attempts to deploy “special ops” teams from different branches of the
military in an integrated fashion – particularly when one adds in that special
ops has collectively been long regarded with collective suspicion by the
“regular” military. When one adds the CIA into the mix, it is easy to
understand why joint-ness has been such a challenge – although there have
been significant improvements in recent years.75
72

RICHARD A. STUBBING, THE DEFENSE GAME 142 (1986)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/urgfury.pdf. In the Hollywood version, a
Marine squad was in danger of being overrun, and was unable to request air support
because its radio had been destroyed. A young Marine (played by Mario Van Peebles)
patched together a phone line, and placed a call to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, using
a credit card that he had carried into battle. The call was relayed to a Navy ship stationed
off Grenada, which coordinated the necessary close air support. See Heartbreak Ridge
(1986).
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See, e.g., DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN, BUREAUCRACY AND
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 71 (2006) (“A specialist in marine biology may in some
sense work for the Department of Commerce, but in his or her mind, the job is not with the
Commerce Department or even with the NOAA, but with the National Marine Fisheries
Service.”)
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Marc Ambinder, The Secret Team that Killed Bin Laden, NATIONAL J. May 3, 2011,
at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killed-bin-laden20110502 (“Sunday’s operation provides strong evidence that the CIA and JSOC work
well together. . . In an interview at CIA headquarters two weeks ago, a senior
intelligence official said the two proud groups of American secret warriors had been
“deconflicted and basically integrated” -- finally -- 10 years after 9/11.”); Greg Miller &
Julie Tate, CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets, WASH. POST, Sep 1, 2011 at A1 (“The CIA
was heavily involved in the raid by U.S. Special Operations troops on a compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May. Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs, but the
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In like fashion, the CIA has had a long-standing cultural conflict
between analysts and field agents, as well as ongoing debates between
internal communities that favor either reliance on high technology
monitoring systems (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) or “Humint” (on the
ground in-person collection of intelligence). Those who design and manage
intelligence gathering through advanced technology systems tend to have
backgrounds in science and engineering.
The human intelligence
community tends to be drawn from individuals with skills in the social
sciences. Not surprisingly, each individual unit believes it has a monopoly
(or near-monopoly) on the optimal approach to intelligence gathering and
analysis, and the efforts of other units are viewed with disdain.
The problem is not limited to the uniformed services: the U.S. Forest
Service has experienced similar difficulties as it has expanded from an
agency staffed solely by foresters to a more diversified ecosystem. As
James Q. Wilson observed, “today foresters have to contend with engineers,
biologists, and economists, among others. The foresters dislike the
tendency of engineers to elevate mechanical soundness over natural beauty,
of biologists to worry more about endangered species than about big game,
and of economists to put a price on things foresters regard as priceless.”76
As these examples illustrate, the combination of related functions
within a single department or agency does not mean that good things will
inevitably result. Indeed, destructive rivalry can mean that 2+2 = 1, instead
of 4.
6.

Collateral Effects on the Regulatory Ecosystem

The government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies
and inter-agency working groups, departments and commissions. Many of
these institutions have overlapping authority – sometimes by reason of
deliberate legislative choice and sometimes by accident. As noted
previously, in some instances shared authority stems from conscious
congressional decisions to dedicate policymaking responsibilities to two or
operation was carried out under CIA authority, planned in a room at agency headquarters
and based on intelligence gathered over a period of years by the CTC.
The assault was the most high-profile example of an expanding collaboration between
the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees the nation’s elite
military teams. Their comingling at remote bases is so complete that U.S. officials ranging
from congressional staffers to high-ranking CIA officers said they often find it difficult to
distinguish agency from military personnel. ‘You couldn’t tell the difference between CIA
officers, Special Forces guys and contractors,” said a senior U.S. official after a recent tour
through Afghanistan. “They’re all three blended together. All under the command of the
CIA.’”)
76
Wilson, supra note 7, at 65.
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more public bodies. Sometimes the deliberate duplication of responsibility
stems from Congressional desire to test alternative institutional means of
delivering a desired policy result.77 On other occasions it reflects an
explicit desire to use interagency rivalry to spur performance
improvements.78 Finally, as we describe below, technological change and
market developments can give rise to regulatory overlaps “by accident.”
Whatever the origins, the fact of overlapping authority typically
elicits effort by the agencies with shared jurisdiction to coordinate their
efforts. These efforts do not arise because the agencies in question like
each other. In many circumstances, rivalry among agencies to be seen as
the lead institution in a given field of regulation is inevitable, as perceptions
of primacy influence congressional decisions about budgets, affect the
recruitment of skilled staff, and generally shape the agency’s self-image. In
analyzing the conduct of public institutions, one rarely goes wrong by
overestimating the power of parochialism and self-interest to warp
behavior.
Even though agencies with contested or contestable functions
compete aggressively with each other, they often come to realize the need,
at least on some level, to avoid destructive duplication and to invest in joint
activities to deliver better policy results. The means of cooperation and
coordination are myriad, and range from formal exchange of written
instruments (e.g., memoranda of understanding) to the creation of
interagency working groups to less formal (but still important) personal
interaction among agency heads, senior managers, and case handlers. In
ways that are sometimes visible but more often invisible to external
observers, agencies with overlapping authority and responsibilities routinely
create a vibrant and interlocking ecosystem of cooperation.
When regulatory tasks are reallocated, or a new agency is inserted
into the mix, or new powers are given to an existing agency, there is a
significant potential to disrupt this regulatory ecosystem. Disruption can
take a variety of forms. The new entrant may siphon off money and
77

This is probably the best interpretation of the decision of Congress in 1914 to
establish the FTC and to give the Commission concurrent authority with the Department of
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See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid
Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. LAW J. AM. UNIV. 461 (1995) (discussing congressional
decision in 1980s to give General Services Board of Contract Appeals broader bid protest
authority and create an alternative to protest oversight by the General Accounting Office).
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personnel, making it difficult for incumbent agencies to perform their
existing responsibilities. Reallocation of authority may also upset longstanding understandings that formed the basis for fruitful inter-agency
collaboration. The entrant may receive a substantive mandate whose formal
commands resemble the language that appears in the statutes of other
regulatory authorities. The interpretation of the new entrant’s mandate in
one judicial could spill over into the interpretation of the mandates of other
agencies in separate cases.
To be sure, Congress certainly has the authority to close down an
agency entirely, or substantially limit its jurisdiction and authority – and it
knows how to do that when it wants to. But, the kinds of regulatory
reorganizations we have been describing usually do not reflect that
objective – meaning that the damage to the regulatory ecosystem is often an
unintended consequence of Congressional failure to understand that
personnel would migrate to the new and more glamorous and higher paying
outpost – leaving other parts of the regulatory ecosystem permanently
blighted. To summarize, the wisdom and net functional benefits of any
specific realignment of regulatory authority will depend heavily upon
whether the changes build upon a sophisticated understanding of the
existing regulatory ecology.
7.

Political Implications

Politics is a major factor in the design and location of government
agencies and functions.
When the House of Representatives was
considering a climate change bill in 2009, the chair of the House
Agriculture Committee made it clear he would kill the bill if it allocated
responsibility for determining whether farmers would receive credit for
“tilling and conservation practices that keep carbon dioxide stored in the
soil” to the EPA, but would allow it to proceed if responsibility for the same
task resided in the Agriculture Department.79 The choice of location had
real significance; “environmentalists and the bill's main sponsors feared that
the Agriculture Department might use lax standards, which would blow a
79

Derek Thompson, The Collin Peterson Climate Change Compromise, THE
ATLANTIC,
available
at
http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/06/the_collin_peterson_climate_change_compromise_
1.php (“So it looks like the Waxman-Markey climate change bill will pass in the House this
week: The sponsors hammered out an agreement last night with Collin Peterson, the chair
of the Agriculture Committee. The main sticking point was over whether the EPA or the
Department of Agriculture would administer a carbon offset program intended for farmers.
. Peterson got his way: The (more sympathetic) Department of Agriculture will do the
work.”)
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hole through the nationwide cap on carbon dioxide emissions.”80 When
President Franklin Roosevelt’s reorganization committee propose to
consolidate all federal loan programs under the Treasury Department, FDR
vetoed the suggestion, observing “that won’t work. If they put them in the
Treasury, not one of them will ever make a loan to anybody for any
purpose. There are too many glass-eyed bankers in the Treasury.”81 More
recently, privacy advocates have expressed skepticism about the Obama
Administration’s Internet privacy proposals because the Commerce
Department is taking the lead, instead of a more pro-consumer agency, like
the FTC.82
As these examples illustrate, decisions about where to place certain
responsibilities are simultaneously decisions about who will resolve certain
disputes, and, in turn, what the outcome is likely to be.
Once regulatory authority has been allocated in the first instance,
Congressional committees are extremely reluctant to cede authority. Like
elsewhere, there are gains from expertise; individual members gain
knowledge and experience with an agency’s operations over a period of
years, and proposals to transfer regulatory authority to an agency that is
overseen by a different committee places that investment of intellectual
capital at risk. In like fashion, a committee that is comfortable with the way
a particular agency handles matters may be reluctant to allow others to take
ownership of “their baby,” fearing their successors may not share their
priorities. Finally, individual members of Congress derive important
electoral advantages from the committees on which they service, including
80

Steven Mufson, Vote Set on House Climate Bill, Wash. Post, June 24, 2009,
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access to campaign contributions from those who are affected by the
activities of government agencies subject to the oversight of the
committees. Oversight of a specific government agency creates a revenue
stream that flows from the affected industry to the committee’s members.
Reorganization measures that alter an agency’s powers can reduce or
eliminate the revenue stream to a given committee. This dynamic makes it
clear why Congress takes a keen interest in reorganization.83
Agency personnel are acutely conscious of these considerations, and
they will dismiss out of hand organizational changes that create political
difficulties. For example, NOAA resulted from a blue-ribbon commission
set up by the Johnson Administration, which recommended the creation of
an independent agency focused on the ocean and atmosphere, including
bureaus drawn from various civilian departments plus the Coast Guard
(which was then part of DOT).84 After NOAA was created and placed in
the Department of Commerce, a senior Commerce administrator contacted
the Secretary of Transportation to discuss the possibility of transferring the
Coast Guard, in keeping with the recommendations of the blue-ribbon
commission. The Secretary of Transportation responded that he was
supportive of the move, but in exchange he wanted the Maritime
Administration to be transferred from Commerce to DOT. The senior
administrator immediately responded “no deal,” because he recognized that
the swap would rob the Department of Commerce of the political support of
the maritime industry, and would alienate a key congressman.85
The same considerations also help explain why the reorganization
that yielded the Department of Homeland Security was so politically
difficult. No committee was inclined to surrender oversight authority unless
it got something of at least equal value in return. Even after the politics
made reorganization inevitable, individual Congressional committees
insisted on retaining regulatory oversight of “their” part of DHS.86
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These dynamics tend to freeze in place existing allocations of
policymaking power and to disable reform proposals that would move
authority away from some government agencies and give it to others. In his
State of the Union addresses in 2010 and 2011, President Barack Obama
proposed to reorganize and simplify various elements of the federal
government. This proposal seems certain to run afoul of the constraints
discussed here, even in the most harmonious political environment.
In light of the political phenomena described here, it is tempting to
simply acquiesce in the inevitability of the existing distribution of agency
responsibility. But, major exogenous shocks (such as budget crises) can
make substantial reorganizations politically possible (if not inevitable) – at
which point the other six factors become more important in determining the
allocation of responsibilities among the various bureaus, commissions,
agencies, and departments that make up the United States government.
Finally, the simple fact there is an ongoing demand for
reorganization, even in the absence of major exogenous shocks, means that
these issues are constantly in play. No one ever permanently surrenders,
and there is no final judgment rule enforced on the disputants.87
B. Which Criteria Matter Most?
What mattes most in our list of seven criteria? The problem is
straightforward: as Judge Frank Easterbrook has noted, “Lists without
metes, bounds, weights, or means of resolving conflicts do not identify
necessary or sufficient conditions; they never prescribe concrete results.”88
We believe that three factors matter most in predicting the long-term
success of any given agency design: political implications, coherence, and
capacity/capability.
In our view, the most important factor is political support, or the
lack thereof. An agency is doomed if it lacks a supportive constituency, or

subcommittees - a number that has grown in the past seven years, despite the 9/11
Commission's recommendation that those tangled lines of authority be consolidated.”)
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Cf. Wilson, supra note 7, at 299-300 (“Public policy making in Europe is like a
prize-fight: two contenders, having earned the right to enter the ring, square off against
each other for a prescribed number of rounds; when one fighter knocks the other one out,
he is declared the winner and the fight is over. Policy-making in the United States is more
like a barroom brawl: Anyone can join in, the combatants fight all comers and sometimes
change sides, no referee is in charge, and the fights last not for a fixed number of rounds
but indefinitely or until everybody drops from exhaustion. To repeat former Secretary of
State George Shultz’s remark, ‘its never over.’”)
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if the performance of its duties generates crippling political opposition.89
More broadly, an agency will not be able to operate effectively if its
structure raises serious doubts about its legitimacy or increases the
vulnerability to political pressure that the performance of its duties will
arouse.
The second most important factor is policy coherence. Greater
coherence increases the likelihood the agency will define its aims more
clearly, set priorities and design programs appropriately, and develop a
well-recognized brand. Coherence makes it easier to recruit qualified staff
and build the necessary capacity to implement whatever programs are
prioritized. An agency with policy coherence is accordingly better able to
establish its credibility with external audiences, including the legislators
who will determine funding and otherwise oversee agency operations.
The third most important factor is the agency’s capacity/capability
to perform its assigned functions. A severe mismatch between the
commitments in an agency’s policy portfolio and its capacity and capability
to deliver results is likely to result in highly visible failures, of which
Congress is usually quite unforgiving. Agencies with an inadequate talent
pool and frail resources are more likely to generate poorly conceived
programs, and less likely to execute tasks effectively. The mismatch
between commitments and capacities creates a grim set of options. An
agency can engage in policy triage, in the hope there will be no disasters in
the ignored policy space and that no one cares enough about the tasks that
are being ignored to make a fuss. Alternatively, an agency can try to cover
all the assigned responsibilities with the predictable consequence of doing
few (if any) of them well.
Of course, these factors are not fully independent: an agency is more
likely to have the necessary resources (i.e., capability) if it has strong
political supporters. An agency that slights or over-emphasizes a portion of
its regulatory portfolio is skating on thin ice unless its political supporters
are on board with that decision. (If those political supporters are voted out
of office, the agency needs to quickly adapt, or there will be significant
blow-back to subsequent initiatives, as the FTC learned to its dismay in the
late 1970s.) Similarly, without policy coherence, an agency is less likely to
attract and maintain political support in the first instance. Finally, there are
further levels of complexity imbedded within some of the factors.90
89
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Our typology raises other difficult questions. Are all of the factors
scalable? Are any of them? Can one compensate for weakness on one
factor with strength on another? Does one need a minimum quantum of all
of the factors to get off the launching pad? And so on. These issues must
await better data and require further research.
IV. Application of Our Analysis to the FTC
We use the FTC as a case study because the Commission’s
experience provides an especially rich context in which to apply the criteria
we have described above. Established in 1914, the FTC is the oldest and
most closely studied independent regulatory commission in the federal
government.91 The FTC has inspired an immense body of scholarship and
figured prominently in blue ribbon reports that examine the organization of
government. No public regulatory body (much less an agency with roughly
1300 employees and a budget of under $300 million today) has elicited
comparable scrutiny.
A. The FTC as a Multi-Purpose Agency
In the FTC’s near-century of experience provides superb material to
assess the wisdom of combining variations functions in a single government
agency. Two closely-related characteristics of the FTC’s history make it an
ideal test bed for our inquiry. The first is the breadth of the agency’s
charter. The FTC is a diversified policy conglomerate. It enforces the
federal antitrust laws, performs economic research, publishes studies, and
holds a broad consumer mandate that reaches advertising, non-bank
financial services, marketing practices, product labeling, and privacy.
Among other tasks, it is the agency that reviews mergers in the petroleum
industry, enforces the Do-Not-Call telemarketing rule, defines energy
labeling requirements for television sets, polices debt collection practices,
reports on how media and entertainment companies disclose content
unsuited for children, and prosecutes failures by companies to safeguard
confidential data about their customers.
by the allocated budget, but does it make a difference if the agency is funded with user fees
v. dedicated taxes v. general appropriations? To what extent does the mix of funding
among these choices reflect the impact of other factors – most importantly, political
support?
91
The Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887, was the first
independent federal regulatory agency. Its sole surviving component today is the Surface
Transportation Board, whose chief function is to regulate tariffs and other terms of surface
by railroads.
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The second notable aspect of the Commission’s history is the
malleability of its policy making portfolio. In 1914 Congress intended the
Commission to focus on competition policy – to advance the development
of antitrust legal norms through administrative adjudication, consultation
with the federal courts and the Department of Justice, and through the
publication of studies for Congress and other public bodies The boundaries
of the original remit have shifted dramatically over time. In some instances,
the FTC absorbed new functions by accident.92 The Commission became
the nation’s advertising and marketing practices regulator as an unintended
consequence of its work to address complaints by firms that their rivals had
gained an undue competitive advantage through dishonest sales tactics. In
other instances the FTC obtained new duties because Congress deliberately
added new functions by measures such as credit practices legislation
enacted in the 1960s.
Additions of authority have been pronounced in periods, such as the
early- to mid-1970s, when Congress enacted numerous extensions of the
FTC’s duties. The Commission’s history features divestitures as well as
acquisitions. In some cases, the Commission in effected incubated
regulatory functions that Congress later chose to spin-off and assign to new,
stand-alone regulatory institutions.93 For example, this process led to the
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s.
These adjustments appear to have reflected a legislative judgment that the
regulatory functions in question were so substantial that they warranted
implementation by agencies dedicated to those activities alone. On other
occasions Congress has divested or restricted FTC functions out of anger.
Political backlash to FTC initiatives led Congress to enact curbs in the
1920s on the agency’s authority involving agriculture and to adopt
restrictions in 1980 upon the Commission’s work concerning insurance and
advertising directed toward children.94
B. The Evaluative Criteria Applied to the FTC
We organize our discussion around the seven factors identified in
Part III. We consider to which the FTC’s combination of functions is
consistent with each criterion, and we use examples from FTC experience
to illustrate our assessment.
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1. Policy Coherence: Are the Functions Related and Consistent?
In principle, the combination of competition and consumer
protection functions within the FTC is a coherent policy design. The two
areas exhibit strong conceptual policy complementarities, and the agency’s
implementation of its competition and consumer protection powers achieves
substantial policy consistency: in performing its responsibilities in both
policy domains, the agency generally seeks to improve consumer wellbeing. As we discuss below, the interaction of the two policy areas can
create tension, as each discipline can display a different view about how
best to advance consumer interests. The attainment of the best policy
outcome sometimes will require balancing between competing perspectives.
a. Relatedness: Significant Policy Complementarities
Competition policy and consumer protection policy have important
complementarities. They share significant intellectual foundations in the
economics of information and consumer behavior.95 In general terms,
antitrust seeks to improve performance on the supply side – to sustain the
competitive pressures that drive firms to offer best possible array of goods
and services. Antitrust agencies pursue this end by prosecuting private
anticompetitive behavior (such as supplier cartels) and opposing public
policies that restrict entry or expansion for the sake of protecting the
interests of incumbent firms. Consumer protection seeks to improve the
choice process on the demand-side. This principally involves programs to
challenge deception and fraud, a consumer protection program helps ensure
that sellers provide truthful information, which enables consumers to
purchase goods or services that best satisfy their preferences. Transactions
induced by deception and outright fraud do not satisfy the necessary
conditions for making consumer sovereignty the force that determines what
the economy will produce. A consumer protection also can enhance the
quality of consumer decision making by ensuring that product and service
disclosures, such as information required by legal mandates, are
comprehensible to consumers.96
The complementarities between competition policy and consumer
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protection policy, as well as possibilities for substitution between them,
here provide at least a theoretical basis for supposing that a competition
agency with consumer protection responsibilities will realize synergies
between the two fields and improve the quality of public policy. A unity of
functions might put an agency in a better position to identify the source of
market failures more accurately and proscribe superior cures that involve an
optimal mix of regulatory strategies.97 Many of the world’s 120
competition agencies perform consumer protection functions, such as
policing deceptive advertising.98 We make no claim that the existing dualfunction agencies ordinarily attain the theoretical synergies in practice, or
that the combination of functions affords them superior insight into the
causes of economic problems. In principle, the presence of strong policy
complimentarities indicates that the integration of these functions within a
single agency has potential to improve policy making.
The presence of strong policy complementarities suggests a general
principle that would apply in jurisdictions that do not choose to bundle
complementary functions into the same agency. If policy complementarities
are strong and policy responsibilities are assigned to single-function
agencies, there should be close cooperation between the single-function
agencies. In other words, if integration by ownership does not occur, close
integration by inter-agency contract is desirable. Close cooperation by a
single-function antitrust agency and a single-function consumer protection
agency likely will yield better policy results than having the two institutions
operate without regard to the other’s activities.
b. Consistency: Common Consumer Orientation
As the discussion above suggests, competition and consumer
protection share a common objective or promoting consumer well-being.
This common objective imparts a substantial degree of consistency to
policies adopted in the two domains. We can contrast this condition with
other policies that might be considered to be related but not consistent.
Antitrust law and trade restrictions can be considered to be complimentary
to the extent that both regimes seek to prevent market distortions that arise
when firms make certain sales below cost. The goals of the two regimes,
however, are dissimilar. In antitrust law, the purpose of restrictions on
predatory pricing is to preclude behavior that results in the exclusion of
firms whose continued presence in the market would have driven suppliers
97
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to engage in activities (such as cost reduction and innovation) that serve
consumer interests. An important aim of the anti-dumping regime, reflected
in its operational standards, is the protection of domestic firms and the
preservation of jobs they provide, even at the expense of purchasers of the
products such firms manufacture.
Notwithstanding their complementarities, it also is possible to view
competition policy and consumer protection policy as substitutes. As this
simple example illustrates, competition can serve as a valuable form of
consumer protection. We can imagine a hypothetical market in which the
government can choose one of two approaches to encourage performance
that best satisfies consumer preferences. One approach is to have a single
firm serve the entire market, with the monopolist supplier being subject to
comprehensive oversight with respect to pricing and quality. Even with
extensive regulatory oversight, the monopolist may have relatively weak
incentives to identify and satisfy consumer tastes, especially by introducing
new products and services. A second approach is to encourage rivalry
among suppliers to provide the best range of alternatives. The latter
approach also involves greater reliance on market forces to counteract fraud
and other forms of overreaching by suppliers. The pro-competition policy
contemplated here includes efforts to preclude supplier collusion that would
restrict the flow of truthful product information to consumers or would
impede the work of expert intermediaries to give consumers advice about
how to select among product options.
In a number of instances, the solution set for policy making will
include a range of alternatives that include more or less relative emphasis
on these two models. In most instances, the lawyers who practice in the
fields of antitrust or consumer protection will be inclined to favor one
model or the other, depending upon their training and experience.
Specialists in one field rarely have extensive familiarity with the other.
This form of specialization gives the two practice areas distinctive cultures,
each with different preferences for the form of government intervention.
Most antitrust lawyers are likely to have relatively greater confidence in the
capacity of competition and related market-oriented processes to provide a
desired level of consumer protection. By contrast, the consumer protection
lawyer may less trusting of market processes and more inclined to perceive
consumers as vulnerable and prone to supplier manipulation. This
orientation will incline a consumer protection attorney to favor policies that
more directly control business practices – for example, by setting greater
limits upon the content of advertising. This orientation can be reinforced by
an attorney’s extensive experience in dealing with serious fraud. A heavy
dose of cases involving products that are claimed to cure cancer, yield
immense wealth, or secure lasting beauty can engender an underlying
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suspicion of the market system. Like an experienced homicide detective
who fears that all of humankind is dangerously prone to violent crime, an
experienced consumer protection attorney may come to think that most
advertising is a form of falsehood.
These differences in culture and perspective between the two
disciplines can be important for the operation of the regulatory process even
within an agency that has both competition and consumer protection duties.
The integration of perspectives to achieve the best policy result (for
example, by designing an anti-fraud program that properly accounts for the
role of advertising in promoting competition that serves consumer interests)
will not occur automatically. Within the FTC, the Bureau of Economics is a
major source of agency’s policy integration. BE functions as an
independent unit, and it supports the agency’s competition and consumer
protection groups. Among other contributions, BE has helped the agency
account for the economics literature concerning the collection, analysis, and
transmission of information and has highlighted its implications for the
behavior of individual firms and groups of firms. This has improved the
agency’s understanding of how consumers make choices among the array of
products and services available to them.99 The FTC’s experience shows that
a dual function agency will need to take conscious steps to achieve effective
integration and resolve tensions that can arise concerning the correct mix of
regulatory measures.
c. Examples from FTC Experience
The FTC’s experience with the health care, health-related
advertising issues, and data protection provides illuminates the synergies
and tensions that can arise between competition and consumer protection.
In the 1970s, the Commission introduced pioneering programs to liberalize
the provision of health care services and products.100 Before the 1970s,
regulatory policy at the federal and state levels tended to establish severe
restrictions on advertising by physicians and strong limits on the ability of
consumers to seek alternative suppliers for health care products such as
eyeglasses.
To address these restrictions, the FTC used a mix of litigation,
99
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rulemaking, research, public consultations, and advocacy. The Commission
initiated a series of cases that struck down absolute restrictions on physician
advertising and precluded medical societies from forbidding the revelation
of truthful information. The agency also adopted a trade regulation rule
(Eyeglasses I) that, among other measures, required optometrists to give a
copy of eyewear prescriptions to their patients. The rule originated within
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the agency’s Bureau of
Economics and Bureau of Competition played major roles in its design.
Eyeglasses I fostered a dramatic increase in competition among eyewear
manufacturers and retailers. Over the past decade, the FTC has used
experience with the eyeglasses rule to implement legislation mandating
steps to liberalize the sale of contact lenses. The agency also has filed an
extensive series of comments with state legislatures to address existing or
proposed adjustments to controls on the sale of health care services and
products. To identify commercial trends and promote debate about its
programs, the Commission also has held public consultations and published
reports.
These elements of the FTC’s health care program have built upon a
generally effective collaboration among the agency’s different disciplines.
A major source of policy integration has been the Bureau of Economics,
whose research and analysis have played a crucial role in assessing the
asserted quality control justifications for the regulatory status quo. A
second important force for integration has been the agency-wide Office of
Policy Planning and the Policy Studies group of the Office of the General
Counsel. Relatively few internal tensions have arisen in the formulation of
this program, perhaps because the Commission ordinarily has been in the
position of attacking fairly categorical competitive restraints that bear no
plausible relationship to the quality control rationales that are said to justify
limitations on advertising or marketing. Some of the agency’s more recent
initiatives, such as the contact lens matters, have involved practices with
more subtle and complex quality control concerns. The Commission has
analyzed these issues with care, a reflection of the Commission’s awareness
that a failure to account for legitimate quality control considerations could
cause serious consumer injury and endanger the agency’s entire program in
this field.
An initiative with more mixed results and greater internal tension is
the FTC’s treatment of health-related advertising claims. For many years,
public policy developed by the FTC and federal health agencies such as the
Food and Drug Administration displayed an acute suspicion of food
advertisements that attributed beneficial health effects to the consumption
of a product. Federal policy tended to frown upon producer efforts to link
product attributes to a reduction in the risk of disease. Research by the
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FTC’s Bureau of Economics in the 1980s and 1990s called this approach
into question. The FTC’s economists raised the possibility that a more
liberal approach would provide consumers with valuable nutritional
information and promote product innovations (such as the introduction of
higher fiber content into breakfast cereals) with generally positive health
effects. The FTC has relied upon this line of research to loosen its own
controls upon health claims and to advocate similar adjustments by the
FDA.101
These initiatives have inspired considerable tension within the FTC
and the larger policy making community. A task force consisting of the
FTC, the FDA, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Health and Human Services recently released proposed guidelines for food
advertising directed toward children. The guidelines are cast as voluntary
measures, although the agencies suggest that the industry’s failure to
embrace them or to take similar steps could result in additional government
intervention. For the most part, the proposed guidelines reflect the
longstanding tradition of suspicion that anchored public policy before the
Bureau of Economics research of the 1980s and 1990s. A similar effort to
toughen limits on nutritional advertising is evident in settlements that
resolve recent FTC advertising cases. The Commission’s settlements
require producers to use more elaborate scientific testing to substantiate
health-related claims. These measures reflect, at least implicitly, a doubtful
view of the market-oriented prescriptions that came out of the Bureau of
Economics studies of the 1980s and 1990s.
Issues related to data protection and information privacy provide
another context in which debates have arisen about what mix of competition
and consumer protection initiatives will best serve consumer interests. In
December 2010 and March 2012, the FTC released reports with proposals
that firms to strengthen data security safeguards and increase the ability of
consumers to control the collection and use about their purchasing and
searches on the internet.102 The reports recommended consideration of a
‘Do-Not-Track mechanism that would enable a consumer to instruct firms
not to maintain records of the consumer’s online activity. The FTC’s
reports revealed little evident input from the Commission’s competition or
economics operating bureaus.
2. Credibility: Does the Combination Create A Recognizable and
Respected Brand?
101
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The FTC has strived to establish general recognition that it is the
principal federal agency for safeguarding consumer interests. This is
common element of branding by agencies with a dual competition and
consumer protection mandate. The United Kingdom’s Office of Fair
Trading (OFT), which has largely the same remit as the FTC, states its
purpose as “making markets work well for consumers.”103 This short and
statement of purpose is one of many ways that similarly situated agencies
identify themselves with the promotion of consumer well-being.
In this aim, the Commission appears to have been generally
successful. Its public reputation and its stature within Congress largely
derive from its consumer protection work, especially highly visible
initiatives such as the Do Not Call program.104 There is only modest
awareness of the Commission’s role as a competition policy institution, and
perhaps still weaker understanding of how the agency’s combination of
functions informs its choice and execution of programs. Thus, the agency is
largely associated with consumer protection issues. The breadth of the
agency’s mandate can create unwanted expectations that the agency is the
appropriate solution for all difficult economic problems that affect
consumers.
a. Branding a Policy Conglomerate
As a policy conglomerate, the FTC faces the same difficulties that
confront many diversified enterprises: How does the entity create a brand
that internal observers (agency managers and staff) and external
constituencies (e.g., legislators, businesses, and consumers) recognize and
respect? The FTC’s purpose is not evident from its name. In the modern
world, a “federal trade commission” evokes associations with agencies that
scrutinize imports and penalize foreign firms that sell goods below cost in
the United States. When FTC employees return from overseas travel and
present their official passports to U.S. immigration officers, they are to be
asked if they made progress in trade negotiations with foreign governments.
Over the years, the FTC has used various phrases to identify its purpose. In
general, most of the agency’s branding activities have sought to identify the
Commission with the promotion of consumer interests.105 Most of this
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branding effort takes place in official reports and speeches by top agency
leadership, particularly the FTC Chair.
Within the FTC, administrative and professional staff members
appear to share a general sense of purpose. If asked to respond to a survey,
most would say that the agency seeks to protect consumer well-being. At
the same time, we doubt that many could explain how the two principle
mandates of the agency combine to fulfill that purpose. In 2008, the FTC
performed a self-study and conducted internal and external interviews to
identify paths for improvement.106 Agency staff members ordinarily define
the agency’s brand and purpose in terms of the projects of their own
operating units. It is relatively unusual to find personnel in the Bureau of
Competition or Bureau of Consumer Protection who could identify five
major pending initiatives of the other Bureau.
This raises a basic question about agency organization: is a dual
purpose competition and consumer protection agency more likely to
reinforce awareness of its dual, complementary nature among its own
personnel and increase external understanding of its character if it takes
formal steps to integrate these functions internally. We know of a single
agency – the OFT – that has undertaken internal organizational reforms to
create integrated operating units (both policy offices and teams of case
handlers) that combine the disciplines of competition and consumer
protection. The OFT adopted these reforms within the past decade, and it is
difficult to tell how this has affected internal and external perceptions of the
agency’s brand and purpose. It is clear that efforts by OFT leadership to
emphasize the conceptual and organizational fusion of the two disciplines
have made internal and external constituencies increasingly aware of the
combination of functions.
In testimony and speeches, FTC leaders have emphasized the
conceptual links between competition and consumer protection, but the
Commission has not undertaken the ambitious internal restructuring carried
out by the OFT. The FTC has relied on much looser forms of integration to
achieve a synthesis of competition and consumer protection policy
internally and enhance its external branding efforts. There is relatively little
routine collaboration between the Bureau of Competition and Bureau of
Consumer Protection.
The agency relies mainly on the agency’s
commissioners, the Bureau of Economics, the Office of Policy Planning,
and the General Counsel’s office of policy studies to see that both
perspectives inform the treatment of problems facing the agency. An
attempt to create dual purpose operating groups from the existing Bureaus
Force for Consumers and Competition (Mar. 2008) (annual report).
106
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of Competition and Consumer Protection will be prohibitively expensive in
the eyes of most FTC chairs. Internal resistance will be ferocious and
durable – good reasons for a chair to use precious time (a tenure of three or
four years) and energy on other matters. Yet there are milder alternatives
worth exploring. These include greater reliance on inter-bureau task forces
and a routine program of secondments that assign personnel from one unit
to work in another.
The desire to create broad awareness of an agency as a proconsumer agency can affect, and distort, the agency’s allocation of
resources. As noted above, consumer protection initiatives generally have
the greatest impact on consumer perceptions. The Do Not Call registry,
cases that return monetary redress to victims of fraud, and educational
materials on ID theft are but some of the many FTC initiatives that provide
services which consumers readily understand.
Antitrust matters
(particularly matters involving widely known providers of consumer goods
and services) sometimes create broad public awareness. Nonetheless, the
typical antitrust case (such as a challenge to a merger involving suppliers of
inputs to the production of industrial goods) has less ability than the typical
consumer protection case to raise public awareness of the agency. To this
one can add the generally accurate proposition that what might be called
routine consumer protection cases (e.g., a case against fraud) are less
expensive to prepare than routine antitrust cases.
A dual purpose agency that sees a greater return to its reputation
(and stronger approval by its legislature) may choose to invest more
resources in consumer protection, even though the investment of the same
resources in an antitrust case would contribute more to economic
performance. The FTC now spends about 55 percent of its resources on
consumer protection, and the balance on competition. As a rough matter,
the greatest legislative pressures in recent years have demanded more
attention to consumer protection matters involving financial services and
privacy. Competition issues (notably, involving prices for petroleum
products) receive significant congressional attention, as well, but the focus
of concern has been on consumer protection matters. This also creates
strong incentives for a dual purpose agency to shift resources toward the
consumer protection agenda. Thus, for dual purpose agencies it is worth
examining their distribution of resources over time to determine whether
different responsibilities are receiving suitable emphasis.
b. Branding and the Assignment of Regulatory Tasks
The assignment and performance of regulatory tasks can either
reinforce or undermine the creation of a strong and favorable consumer-

46

Divide or Conquer?

oriented brand. The FTC’s deepest impact on consumer perceptions has
come through its consumer protection activities. Like the FTC, most dualfunction agencies derive the highest levels of public recognition from
interventions dealing with consumer goods and services. Competition
matters generally do not diminish recognition of the agency’s consumer
orientation, but they rarely reinforce it. Compared to consumer protection,
competition policy activity tends to have a neutral impact on the FTC brand.
The consumer protection portfolio is not always an unmixed
blessing for branding purposes. Under a large umbrella of consumer
protection, a dual purpose agency is likely to find specific duties that blur or
damage its image. In a number of instances, the FTC has sought to off load
responsibilities that undermined its brand. One of these deals with
cigarettes. The FTC was the first federal agency to propose regulatory
action on cigarettes after the issuance of the Surgeon General’s report on
the hazards of smoking in 1964.107 The FTC proposed a trade regulation
rule that would have required tobacco companies to place health warnings
on cigarette packages. Congress eventually adopted legislation mandating
such labeling, but it assigned responsibility for testing tar and nicotine
levels in cigarettes to the FTC – even though the agency had no particular
expertise in testing, or in assessing the health risks of different levels of tar
and nicotine.
For roughly twenty years, the FTC dutifully ran a “smoking
laboratory,” using machines that measured the tar and nicotine content of
cigarettes smoked using a specified method. In 1987, the FTC ceased
conducting the tests after concluding that it had no comparative advantage
in running a testing laboratory. The FTC outsourced the work to an
independent testing laboratory under the agency’s supervision.108 This
mitigated but did not solve the FTC’s problems. Health researchers
identified that testing regime – which continued to be called “the FTC
method” – did not account for how smokers adjusted their behavior.
Smokers offset the lower tar and nicotine levels by smoking more cigarettes
and inhaling more deeply. Aware of the deficiencies of the testing regimen
and the harm to the agency’s image from being associated with the tests, the
FTC asked Congress to assign all responsibility for the testing program and
107
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the reporting of results to one of the federal departments responsible for
health and science.109
The FTC also has sought to wave off the addition of new functions
that might blur its brand or so divert resources that the enhancement of
well-recognized product lines suffers. One contentious issue during the
debates over the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act was the treatment of credit transactions carried out in connection with
the purchase of a motor vehicle. The automobile dealers fought vigorously,
and successfully, to keep these transactions outside the supervision of the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. However, they did not escape
new regulatory oversight completely. Congress insisted that the new
financial services framework place motor vehicle transactions under the
oversight of some federal agency. Scanning the landscape of possibilities,
Congress gazed at the FTC.110 Fearing that it would receive a major new
mandate without a commensurate increase in funds to carry it out, the
Commission argued against receiving the new authority. These pleas were
unavailing, as was the request for more funds. This experience highlighted
a broader phenomenon that occurs as Congress assigns new duties to an
agency with some experience in the general policy domain: it seldom
provides appropriations to carry out the new commands. The Commission
has competence in credit practices matters going back to the 1960s.
Adapting this expertise to address automobile sales is manageable in
concept, but the resource demands of the new oversight role could be
daunting. With no additional funding, the only way to pay for the new
program is to withdraw support internally from the fulfillment of other
legislative commands
.
i. Portfolio Adjustments, Branding, and Planning
The addition or subtraction of functions has important implications
for the definition of the agency’s aims and its branding activities. As
functions expand or contract, the agency must focus on how the adjustments
will influence perceptions inside and outside the agency about what it does.
The need for greater attention to planning, priority setting, and brand
positioning is perhaps greatest when an agency gains functions, or when
possibilities for addition emerge. Augmentations can greatly affect the
allocation of resources and the mix of programs the agency pursues. Will
109
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an expansion of existing activity to encompass an emerging area of concern
dramatically alter the agency’s character?
Over the past decade, privacy and data protection have ascended as
FTC priorities. As the FTC’s privacy program (now overseen in BCP’s
Division of Privacy and Identify Protection) grows, several paths are
possible. One is a significant redirection of resources that inevitably has the
effect of reorienting the mix of policy outputs and skewing the overall
allocation of funds more heavily toward the consumer protection side of the
FTC’s house. If the FTC moved from a 55/45 split between consumer
protection and competition to something like a 65/35 or 70/30 distribution,
would the wisdom of retaining a competition competence within the FTC,
rather than moving the function entirely to the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department, come into question? Would the growth of the agency’s
privacy role give rise to suggestions that Congress spin the unit off as a
stand-alone data protection body – a move that would put the U.S. national
data protection system on the same institutional footing used by most other
jurisdictions? To answer these and other questions, a multi-function agency
must have a mechanism for considering how dramatic and more subtle
changes in its authority affect its ability to define its brand clearly and
coherently.
3. Capacity and Capability
As described earlier, capacity refers to the pool of knowledge and
resources that the agency can bring to bear, and capability refers to the
range of policy levers and quality of the resulting decisions.
Throughout its history, the FTC has struggled to see that the
commitments entailed by its multifaceted mandate do not outrun its
capacity to deliver good policy results. Through most of its history, the
Commission has suffered from a tendency to initiate ambitious programs
without adequate attention to the basic prerequisites of effective
implementation. These flaws played a major part in placing the agency in
peril in the late 1970s and early 1980s.111 The agency’s extraordinary
combination of competition and consumer protection measures elicited
harsh political backlash and enmeshed the Commission in destructive
turmoil with Congress. Although some FTC initiatives from this period
(such as the Eyeglasses I rule and the beginnings of the antitrust health care
program) succeeded splendidly, many litigation and rulemaking
proceedings foundered in the courts.
The FTC’s performance on this score has improved greatly over the
111

See Kovacic, supra note 94, at 664-71.

Complex Policy Portfolios

49

past 30 years. The agency has learned the hard way to ask basic questions
about each new undertaking: How much will it cost? Who will do it? How
long will it take? What do we expect to accomplish? What are the doctrinal,
political, and management risks? How will we know if it’s working? The
bruising experiences of the late 1970s and early 1980s inspired stronger
attention to planning and program management. The matching of the
FTC’s commitments to capabilities remains a massive challenge for the
institution
a. Chronic Underfunding of Mandates
Agencies seldom will receive the resources needed to fulfill all the
regulatory commands assigned to them. This is the case of the modern
FTC. In many instances, such as the automobile credit sales provision of
Dodd Frank, Congress assigns major new responsibilities without providing
resources to carry them out. The legislative process that generates new
substantive legislation is detached from the process that appropriates funds.
Thus, Congress rarely considers the resource implications of requirements
that the agency enforce new laws, issue new rules, or prepare reports.
Agencies respond to these imperatives in one of two ways, both of
which undermine agency effectiveness. The first is to undertake programs
that exceed the agency’s ability to execute them effectively. The agency
will be tempted to cut corners by weakening internal quality control
measures, understaffing ambitious projects, or assigning difficult litigation
or rulemaking tasks to relatively inexperienced personnel. Even though
senior personnel may recognize how much resource constraints limit agency
capacity, they may still acquiesce in Congressional demands for the
initiation of new projects. A short term political appointee may regard the
initiation of a new measure as a credit-claiming event and may see the risk
that an improvidently conceived project may fail as a cost that will be borne
by future agency leaders and will not be attributed fully, or at all, to the
appointee who originated it. Without an effective feedback mechanism that
forces the incumbent appointee to internalize such costs, it is easy to begin
such projects, even when they outrun the agency’s capacity.
A second mechanism is to fund new projects adequately by a
relatively silent form of triage. This consists of draining resources away
from other programs ostensibly designed to implement congressionally
imposed duties. To support new programs in areas such as privacy, data
protection, and mortgage lending fraud, the FTC over time has quietly
abandoned other programs that used to be mainstays of enforcement. To
some extent this is done with at least the implicit approval of Congress.
Through official budget requests and oversight hearings, Congress is at least

50

Divide or Conquer?

generally aware of how the Commission is spending its money. It can
detect that some areas of policy responsibility seem to be inactive.
Congress can observe, for example, that the FTC has brought two
Robinson-Patman Act price discrimination cases in the past 23 years.112
This reliably indicates diminished attention to a statute whose enforcement
in the 1960s yielded hundreds of cases. For the most part, the FTC has
constructed or retooled major programs involving privacy, financial
services, mergers, horizontal restraints, and single firm conduct by severely
reducing outlays for the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act and
consumer protection statutes dealing with fur and textile labeling.
Even if one accepts the notion that Congress has acquiesced in this
repositioning, there is still a unsettling lack of accountability and
transparency in this pattern. Nominal legal commands remain in place, yet
the agency walks away from them without the type of public deliberation
and debate that arguably ought to proceed an important redirection of
policy. Quiet abandonment and repositioning allow Congress and the
agency to maintain an outward commitment to statutes whose implementing
programs are hollow due to a lack of resources. A more honest approach
would be to consider repeal of unenforced laws or to confront the
commitments vs. resources issue more directly in discussions about new
legislation. The agency also knows that if, for some reason, a seemingly
dormant and neglected policy area comes to life, legislators will chastise it
for not sustaining an adequate presence in the area. It is not honorable to
make policy by crossing one’s fingers and hoping that certain contingencies
do not come to pass.
b. The Sirens of Expansive Authority
The FTC’s history features a painful tendency to over-promise and
under-deliver. One important cause of the mismatch between promises and
performance is the exaggerated sense of capacity that can come from the
broad grants of authority that a multi-function agency often possesses. As
the agency’s powers expand, and Congress urges the agency to use new
authority aggressively, the Commission’s leadership and professional staff
sometimes have perceived that the agency has the ability and the obligation
to solve all economic problems that come to its attention. In the 1970s,
Congress dramatically enhanced the scope and power of the FTC’s
powers.113 In addition, Supreme Court decisions early in the decade
112
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interpreted the Commission’s existing powers broadly. Some FTC officials
have found the possibilities inherent in these developments to be enervating
and willingly grasped new opportunities to exercise them. Others were
more cautious, but they felt a duty to use the agency’s elastic mandates to
address various forms of business behavior, even though the behavior takes
place at or beyond the boundary of the agency’s statutes.
In either case, the zone of what the agency and its leadership
perceive to be appropriate forms of and occasions for intervention will tend
to expand as Congress adds regulatory tools to its portfolio. This is
especially true if the agency’s mandates tend to be far-reaching and
relatively open-ended. This arguably is the case of the FTC, whose
foundational statute permits the agency to condemn “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices” and to proscribe “unfair methods of competition.” Over
time, agency staff has tended to read these statutes in increasingly
expansive ways. For example, in the 1970s, the FTC undertook an
exceptionally ambitious program of competition and consumer protection
matters. Some initiatives produced successful outcomes, but many
ambitious endeavors failed in ways that caused long-lived harm to the
Commission’s reputation and endangered various areas of the FTC’s
mandate.114
The presence of seemingly expansive authority also makes the
Commission an attractive congressional choice to solve any urgent
economic problem that may emerge. If gasoline prices increase sharply in
the wake of a natural disaster, Congress is likely to turn to the FTC, whose
charter enables it to attack “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices,”115 and demand that the agency use these broad
grants of authority to do something about the problem. Any jarring
dislocation in the economy – a price surge in a one sector, or a supply
shortage in another – becomes fair game for legislators to demand that the
FTC bring its seeming open-ended powers to bear upon the problem.116 In
December 2007, Congress enacted legislation to prohibit the manipulation
of petroleum markets and gave the FTC authority to promulgate rules to
enforce the measure.117 In 2009 the FTC adopted an implementing
regulation that Congress will call for the agency to enforce vigorously
powers from 1970 to 1976).
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whenever gasoline prices rise significantly.118 This measure has little
prospect of addressing the two factors that most account for the prices of
petroleum products: the supply of crude oil and the consumption demand of
American consumers and business.
c. Recruiting and Retaining Human Capital
Whether an agency performs one function or many, its performance
depends on whether it has the human resources to accomplish its assigned
tasks. The decision to add a new area of policy responsibility requires an
internal assessment of whether the institution has the right skills to perform
the function. The FTC’s expansion of efforts involving data security and
privacy has led to an increase in personnel with forensic skills in computer
technology, mobile telephony, and internet operations. To support the work
of these professionals, the agency also has made major investments in
internal laboratories and other investigative resources to deal with online
fraud. Likewise, the FTC’s initiatives to work more actively at the
intersection between antitrust law and patent law have led to the hiring of
patent attorneys to serve in the Bureau of Competition.
The failure to maintain a good fit between program demands and
personnel capabilities has crippled FTC programs on a number of occasions
in the past. From 1970 through the middle of the decade, the Commission
undertook an ambitious agenda of programs.119 On the competition side,
the FTC initiated a broad program to challenge monopolization and shared
monopolization in industries such as breakfast cereal, bread, petroleum,
photocopying, and pharmaceuticals. The FTC also began challenge,
described above, to restrictions on advertising imposed by the American
Medical Association. The agency also attacked distribution practices in the
soft drink sector and sought to forbid the parallel, non-collusive adoption of
certain pricing and marketing practices by competitors.
The agency’s consumer protection work during the 1970s was no
less ambitious and perhaps more expansive. The FTC initiated over fifteen
rulemaking proceedings. Some of these measures sought to modify
doctrines with universal application in the economy, such as the holder in
due course rule. Others attempted to impose requirements governing the
provision of specific types of goods or services, including funerals, used
cars, vocational schools, eyeglasses, dietary supplements, hearing aids, and
advertising directed toward children.
The FTC’s economic research program also pursued far-reaching
118
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objectives in the 1970s. The agency established a line-of-business reporting
program that compelled a large number of enterprises to provide detailed
information about their sales and profits in specific product groups. The
Commission also undertook high profile studies involving specific sectors,
including the business of insurance.
This impressive list of projects pressed against the weakest joints of
the Commission’s human capital infrastructure. The agency paid little
attention to the fit between these ambitious measures, many of which
involved novel legal theories and complex facts, and the FTC’s capacity to
execute them skillfully. FTC leadership blithely added new bet-youragency initiatives to Commission’s agenda without a careful examination of
the human capital needed to handle difficult matters successfully. Nor did
the agency anticipate what kinds of talent the affected industries would
muster in opposition. Many of the FTC’s antitrust cases and consumer
protection rulemakings sought powerful remedies to transform the structure
and behavior of the sectors in question. With massive commercial interests
at stake, companies hired the best of the defense bar and the economic
consultancies to represent them. In too many instances, the FTC sent small
and relatively inexperienced teams to face legions of highly capable
opposing counsel.
4. Resilience: Is the Existing Assignment of Functions Adaptable
and Sustainable?
The FTC’s mix of competition and consumer protection has proven
to be adaptable and resilient. As described earlier, the agency’s portfolio
has changed substantially over time.
Sometimes through its own
repositioning and sometimes with congressional approval, the agency has
entered new policy terrain. In the jargon of computer technology, the
Commission’s powers have proven to be highly scalable. At the same time,
the Commission has undergone important divestitures, most notably the
securities regulation remit in the 1930s, consumer product safety in the
1970s, and some elements of financial services in 2010. Each divestiture
principally involved a consumer protection mandate.
On several occasions, the FTC has confronted circumstances where
the original Congressional allocation of regulatory oversight turns out to be
non-adaptive. Consider broadband information services. These products
did not exist (nor were they even imagined) when Congress created the
Federal Communications Commission. Indeed, the FCC’s statutory
framework is premised on the belief that the lowest cost way to provide
telecommunications services is to have a single firm in each geographic
area, and subject that firm to comprehensive oversight by a specialist public
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utility body. Over the past thirty years, changes in technology have made it
apparent that this model is neither inevitable nor optimal, and that
competition in a variety of areas is both feasible and desirable. The
development of the internet and broadband information services have
resulted in considerable dispute over whether the FCC has exclusive
regulatory authority, or whether the FTC has a role to play.120 Jurisdiction
over privacy on the internet has created similar difficulties, as noted
previously.
The FTC’s experience shows both the promise and peril of scalable
allocations of regulatory authority. On numerous occasions, the federal
courts have declared that the FTC’s unfairness authority under section 5 of
the FTC Act confers broad powers to reach a range of conduct not
previously condemned by statute or judicial decisions.121 This expansive
authority gives the FTC the ability to address new commercial phenomena
and create new norms of conduct. For example, the FTC’s emergence as
the principal federal enforcement body concerning data protection and
privacy built upon the application of the Commission’s unfairness authority,
but no one was thinking about the Internet and online privacy in 1914, when
Section 5 of the FTC Act was written.
The FTC’s experience also demonstrates that the application of a
highly scaleable mandate can create three distinct traps. First, legislators
and other external observers come to regard the agency as a solution for all
problems that have an apparent connection to the expansive mandate. For
example, substantial increases in the prices of certain commodities can be
depicted as the result of "unfair" or overreaching behavior by the suppliers
of those goods. Suppose that armed conflict in a major crude oil production
region causes crude oil prices soar. This shock, in turn, forces gasoline
prices upward. Gasoline prices increase because the cost of the principal
input for making gasoline has risen, yet legislators may attribute the price
changes to collusion or unconscionable conduct by petroleum industry
refiners. The agency with the highly elastic mandate will be urged to take
steps (e.g., attacking "price gouging") to push prices downward, yet any
120
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measures taken will not address the underlying cause and may retard market
responses that eventually would cure the problem.
Second, an agency with a sweeping and adaptable mandate has
every incentive to push the outer boundaries of its authority, to show it is
fulfilling the goals set for it by Congress. Unless the agency binds itself to
do otherwise, it will find it easy to expand its claimed authority without
grounding its initiatives in a rigorous conceptual framework that specifies
the logic for intervention and simultaneously delimits the outer boundaries
of the agency’s assertion of authority. Open-ended assertions of authority
invite carelessness in the application of the agency’s powers and blind it to
the broader institutional and political implications of expansive forms of
intervention. These lapses can trigger rebukes from reviewing courts and
provoke severe political backlash.122 Spiderman said it best: with great
power comes great responsibility. Agencies engaged in hot pursuit of what
they perceive to be evil-doers have a distinct tendency to ignore this point.
The third trap arises from the possibility for the agency to exploit
opportunities for what might be called regulatory leveraging across its range
of policy duties. This is evident in recent FTC matters involving mainstays
of the information services sector such as Google. In the development of
the agency’s privacy program, the Commission in recent years has
expressed a keen interest in encouraging companies to adopt stronger data
protection measures and to afford consumers more control over the use of
information that companies collect about their preferences. Some of the
targets of the FTC’s privacy related interests (e.g., Google) have appeared
before the FTC in the course of inquiries related to issues arising under the
Commission’s competition authority. Google, for example, underwent
extensive FTC antitrust reviews concerning its acquisition of Doubleclick
and Admob, respectively.
During the FTC’s deliberations over Google’s mergers, some
Commission officials and staff advocated that the agency use the merger
review process (where companies are obliged by law to notify the federal
antitrust agencies in advance of certain mergers) to exact concessions from
the merging parties concerning their privacy policies and data protection
practices. The Commission resisted this impulse in the Doubleclick and
Admob matters, but it subsequently carried out parallel competition and
consumer protection inquiries in connection with Google’s search practices.
These matters point to a scenario that might unfold in the future. An agency
with multiple functions might use its gatekeeping powers under one
function to induce a company to make concessions with respect to issues
122
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arising under separate elements of the agency’s policy portfolio. For
example, the FTC might tell an information services firm that it will
approve a merger (or accelerate approval of a merger) if the enterprise
promises to make changes to its privacy practices – a matter normally
implicating the FTC’s consumer protection powers. In this way, an
multipurpose agency might achieve policy outcomes that a single purpose
agency might find more difficult to realize.
5. Internal Organizational Cohesion: Will the Combination Result
in Synergies, Distrust, or Civil War?
The FTC features a substantial degree of insularity with its Bureaus
of Competition and Consumer Protection. The relationship between these
two groups is more one of rivalry or indifference rather than cooperation.
Policy integration takes place mainly at the Commission level and through
the work of the Bureau of Economics and the FTC’s Office of Policy
Planning. This means that, if the analytical synergies between the two
disciplines are substantial, a less than ideal amount of combined consumer
protection and competition analysis takes place at the case handling and
middle management levels.
We have mentioned earlier that multi-purpose agencies typically
create single-purpose operating units to carry out specific duties. These
units, in turn, tend to compete with each other for attention and resources,
including outlays for personnel, office space, and control over infrastructure
assets such as the information technology network. This phenomenon can
be observed at the FTC and a number of other agencies that combine
competition and consumer protection duties. Intramural competition for
prestige and resources can cause agency officials to spend substantial effort
refereeing disputes among rival divisions. These are resources that
otherwise would be applied to serving program needs.
Intramural rivalry also can have other costs. If the rationale for
combining functions is to realize synergies between discrete areas of
responsibility, the rivalry for prestige and resources can create internal
tensions that defeat the realization of synergies in practice. Where
individual operating units strive to create separate identities, personnel
within those units may establish strong loyalties to their own units and
define success by the achievements of their units. Projects that entail
cooperation across operating units may be seen by group as relatively
unimportant or simply contrary to each group’s interests, even though
greater collaboration across units would advance projects that serve the
larger aims of the institution as a whole. Where its main operating units are
assigned specific functions, a multi-purpose agency may find it difficult to
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mobilize resources across units unless it can create a “we’re all in this
together” ethos. Otherwise, top agency leadership may have to spend
substantial effort refereeing disputes among rival divisions. These are
resources that otherwise would be applied to serve program needs.
That said, some dynamic tension across units can be helpful. As
noted previously, at the FTC, the formulation of consumer protection policy
(including financial services) has been informed by the analysis and
research of the agency’s Bureau of Economics (BE). In general terms, BE
serves as a voice for the value of competition, for the inclusion of marketoriented strategies in the mix of regulatory tools, and for the awareness of
costs associated with specific regulatory choices. BE also performs
empirical research that has yielded major insights into how consumers
perceive disclosures provided in financial services instruments. In all
matters, BE makes an independent recommendation to the Commission
about the desirability of specific cases, rules, or other proposed initiatives.
BE has emphasized that excessively stringent regulatory controls can (a)
overlook strategies that harness market processes to achieve social policy
goals, and (b) suppress forms of competition that themselves can yield
significant benefits to consumers.
The institutional arrangements through which the Bureau of
Economics makes an independent recommendation to the board helps prod
the board to pay attention to regulatory costs and to the role of competition
and market-based responses in protecting consumer interests. The FTC’s
Bureau of Economics (and, to a lesser extent, the FTC’s Bureau of
Competition) help ensure the FTC takes account of the economic costs and
benefits of law enforcement and rulemaking proposals from the Bureau of
Consumer Protection – and the knowledge that their proposals will be
scrutinized in this fashion forces the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection
to explicitly take account of these matters in making its recommendations in
the first instance.123
Consider a concrete example. In 2007, Michael Sallinger, the head
of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, spoke at a conference jointly sponsored
by the FTC and the National Association of Attorneys General to discuss
policy toward the gasoline industry, including the enforcement of price
gouging laws. His narrative underscores the value of economic analysis as
a discipline upon the FTC’s decision making process:
After hurricane Wilma, a man in Miami with a
flatbed truck drove it to North Carolina – several hundred
123
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miles away – and purchased a set of portable generators,
paying roughly $300 for some and $500 for others. He
drove the truck back to Miami and sold the generators for
approximately double what he had paid for them. The state
sued him for price gouging.
As a matter of economics, this suit was seriously
misguided policy. The initiative shown by this truck owner
helped alleviate the shortage of electricity. We do not need
to give him an award for his initiative. The market did that,
or at least it would have if he had not had to pay a fine to the
state. But we certainly should not be penalizing him. The
next time a disaster strikes Miami, perhaps the truck owner
will try to think of ways to help ease a shortage and simply
decline to profit from it. Perhaps. But that’s not where I
would put my money. More likely, he will just stay put; and
those people who would have voluntarily purchased
whatever supplies he chose to provide will simply go
without. I am confident that professional economists would
agree with my assessment of this case.
But not everyone in the workshop did. As the
discussion of the episode unfolded, it was clear that there
was a divide in the room between the people who work on
antitrust for the states and those who work on consumer
protection. The consumer protection people in the room
generally approved of the case and of price gouging laws
more generally. It was that discussion that made me realize
how valuable economics is to the consumer protection
mission of the FTC. I cannot imagine people from our
Bureau of Consumer Protection arguing for such a case; and
I cannot help thinking that it is the result of the ongoing
dialog between lawyers and economists at the Commission
about what sorts of consumer protection cases make
economic sense that the cases we bring do make economic
sense.124
6. Collateral Effects Upon the Regulatory Ecosystem

As noted earlier, Congress frequently assigns regulatory
responsibility for a specific sector or practice to more than one federal
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agency. The FTC’s expansive competition and consumer protection
responsibilities overlap with or share boundaries the duties of numerous
other federal agencies, as well as a host of state public bodies. The FTC’s
very formation in 1914 and the agency’s subsequent movement into other
policy domains, some by legislative fiat and others through the exercise of
the FTC’s discretion, have affected the larger regulatory ecosystem. To a
large degree, the FTC coexists peacefully with its public agency
counterparts. At the same time, the existing distribution of authority
complicates the execution of routine regulatory tasks.
a. Inter-Agency Coordination
The agency devotes substantial resources to inter-government
coordination. The need in many instances to collaborate with other public
institutions delays the implementation of new initiatives. In a wide range of
areas, the FTC cannot act unilaterally. Adjustments in the oversight of
advertising involving food and health claims require close consultation with
the Food and Drug Administration. The implementation of new legislative
mandates involving market manipulation of petroleum products demands
collaboration with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which
pressed the FTC to narrow as much as possible the scope of its market
manipulation rule. The drafting by the Department of Health and Human
Services of the new rule on Accountable Care Organizations took place
through an often contentious collaboration among the FTC, DOJ, and HHS.
Dodd Frank mandates coordination between the CFPB and the FTC over
the future allocation of enforcement tasks related to non-bank financial
institutions. The fact of shared responsibility and common mandates means
that few collaborative exercises in setting rules or bringing cases proceed
expeditiously.
i. New Entry in an Existing Regulatory Arena: The Case of
Antitrust
The FTC’s establishment in 1914 placed the FTC into a policy
domain already occupied by two other institutions. First, the Clayton and
FTC Acts ended the Justice Department’s position of exclusivity in the
federal government’s enforcement of the antitrust laws. In particular, the
Clayton Act gave DOJ and FTC concurrent authority to enforce its
provisions and did not specify a decision making rule to determine which
agency would handle specific matters. The FTC Act moved the FTC into
the adjudication of federal antitrust matters, a realm that had been the
exclusive responsibility of the federal judiciary.
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Neither of these incursions into the existing ecosystem pleased the
incumbents. In its first decades, the FTC suffered many debilitating defeats
in the federal courts. Some setbacks stemmed from serious weaknesses in
the FTC’s process. The Commission’s early custom was to issue decisions
without elaboration of their legal reasoning and to present the rationale for
decisions only in briefs before the courts. This habit did the agency no
favors when it came time to argue that it deserved deference before the
appellate courts. Yet appellate decisions of this period also reveal a
hostility that cannot be explained solely by the Commission’s poor opinionwriting. The courts did not welcome the introduction of a new adjudication
institution – to some degree, a rival – with open arms.
Nor was the Department of Justice pleased with the arrival of a new
body with whom it would henceforth share decision making tasks. From
early days until the present, the most frequent point of friction has been the
allocation of files where both agencies have competence to review a matter.
At times in the 1920s, the two agencies each opened a file to deal with the
same conduct. The agencies devised informal methods of consultation to
above duplicative parallel inquiries and embodied these understandings in a
formal instrument in the late 1940s. The agreement established the process
by which one agency would “clear” matters to the other.
Since the late 1940s, this liaison arrangement (commonly called
“clearance”) has provided the means by which the agencies avoid conflicts
in the exercise of their concurrent power under the Clayton Act.125 A 2002
press release describes how this process has worked (and not worked) over
time, with agencies handling particular cases based primarily on their
previous expertise in a particular industry:
[B]ecause the FTC had experience with automobiles, it
conducted investigations in that industry; similarly, DOJ
investigated steel matters. . . .
In recent years, the process has become more
contentious as the convergence of industries has blurred
bright lines between industry boundaries. For example,
125
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because the DOJ historically has investigated electricity,
while the FTC has investigated all other energy matters,
convergence mergers between electricity and natural gas
companies have led to contentious disputes regarding which
agency should investigate. Moreover, although the FTC
predominantly has investigated computer hardware and the
DOJ has investigated computer software, matters involving
both have become increasingly common, resulting in
clearance disputes.
In the 1980s, there were only about 10 disputes per
year. Since then, the average has exceeded 80. These
disputes result in significant delays. Delays averaging three
weeks occurred in 24 percent of the matters on which
clearance was sought from the beginning of FY 2000
through January 28, 2002. . . During this time, neither
agency could investigate potentially serious allegations of
illegal behavior.126
As this passage suggests, most matters are cleared quickly and
unobtrusively. Some are highly contentious. The contested matters, though
few in number, imbue the DOJ/FTC relationship with an undercurrent of
suspicion and distrust that undermines the effectiveness of the relationship.
The element of tension has become more acute with the ascent of the FTC
in the modern era to a position of peer status with the DOJ. From 1914
through the 1960s, DOJ was clearly the preeminent U.S. antitrust body.
Through a slow and at times uneven process of improvement, the FTC over
the past twenty years has matched DOJ in prestige. This transformation has
increased the stakes of clearance disputes as each agency seeks to claim
policy terrain that will increase its visibility and accomplishments.
The FTC’s dual identify as a competition and consumer protection
agency promises to be a source of instability in the agency’s relationship
126
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with DOJ. As noted above, consumer protection and competition law have
important conceptual complementarities. In principle, the unification of
supply and demand side perspectives can yield a better understanding of
specific commercial phenomena, a better diagnosis of apparent problems,
and the design of a more effective solution. In recent years, the FTC has
made a point of issuing complaints that invoke an amalgam of competition
and consumer protection theories of harm. The FTC’s settlement in 2010 of
claims of improper single firm conduct by Intel relied upon competition and
consumer protection theories of liability, and FTC officials have
emphasized the hybrid nature of this resolution.127 Earlier FTC decisions,
such as the settlement in Negotiated Data Solutions (N-Data), also featured
a mix of competition and consumer protection rationales.128 Most recently,
the FTC initiated parallel competition and consumer protection inquiries
involving Google’s practices in the market for internet-based search.
DOJ might view the FTC’s application of hybrid
competition/consumer protection theories with suspicion. DOJ might see
the FTC’s recent practice as a strategic move to establish a superior basis to
claim clearance. The FTC might be preparing to assert that individual
matters pose a mix of competition and consumer protection issues and
therefore should be analyzed by an agency with jurisdiction over both
domains. Let us assume that the FTC’s move is not a strategic ploy to
claim more policy terrain. Suppose, instead, that the FTC’s work reflects
the view that the application of the two disciplines can product better policy
outcomes in some cases. Three solutions are possible in these situations.
One is to allocate such files to the FTC because the FTC’s mandate
encompasses both competencies. The second solution is to give the file to
the DOJ on the condition that the two agencies cooperate closely to permit
the FTC to contribute its consumer protection expertise to DOJ’s analysis.
The third is for DOJ to hire officials with consumer protection backgrounds
to work on its cases.
There is another way in which the FTC’s application of a fusion of
competition and consumer protection perspectives could upset the existing
order of federal antitrust enforcement. That is the possibility for regulatory
leveraging described above. The FTC could be tempted to use its
competition policy mandate to obtain policy concessions that relate mainly
to consumer protection. In the guise of doing a competition policy analysis,
the FTC might inform the firm that it will allow the transaction to proceed if
the firm makes commitments with respect to other policy commands (e.g.,
127
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data protection) within the Commission’s policy portfolio ata protection
regime. For example, regulatory leveraging could enable the FTC to realize
privacy policy objectives that might not be obtainable directly through the
prosecution of a consumer protection case or the promulgation of a
consumer protection rule.
There is a constraint on the FTC’s ability to engage in this type of
leveraging. If it became apparent that the FTC was using merger review to
advance a consumer protection agenda, the existing framework of merger
analysis (which does not incorporate consumer protection considerations)
would be called into question. Success with such an approach would
depend on the FTC’s ability to depict the consumer protection issues as
elements of a more sophisticated form of competition analysis.
Whether its duties encompass only competition law or competition
law plus other functions, an agency rarely has exclusive power to shape
policy within the policy domains assigned to it. Single-purpose and multipurpose agencies often share responsibility for a given field of oversight
with still another government agency or agencies. By the conscious design
of a legislature or by accident, a multiplicity of regulatory decision makers
for the same policy area tends to emerge over time. In the field of
competition and consumer protection policy, for example, it is common for
the competition agency to share policy making responsibility with sectoral
regulators that have concurrent or sequential power to review mergers or
allegations of abusive behavior by dominant firms.
7. Political Implications
The dual-role nature of the FTC presents the agency with political
benefits and disadvantages. The principle benefit, mentioned above, is the
possibility of cross subsidization that improves the effectiveness of the FTC
competition program. Consumer protection measures such as the Do Not
Call registry have created substantial policy capital surpluses for the
Commission, and these can be spent effectively to initiate difficult new
matters or to resist political pressure to engage in programs that the agency
believes to be improvident.
There are disadvantages in the existing distribution of power,
although these may be rooted mainly in the FTC’s inherently close
relationship to Congress. The FTC’s ties to Congress introduce severe
rigidities into the agency’s ability to allocate tasks to other agencies with
whom it shares policy responsibilities. In 2002, the Agencies sought to
implement a permanent structural solution to the clearance problem by
explicitly allocating exclusive responsibility for particular sectors of the
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economy to either the FTC or the DOJ.129 Among other features, the
agreement would have dedicated the telecommunications and media sectors
to DOJ while reserving electric power, health care, and aerospace to the
FTC.130 Although the proposal attracted bipartisan support and was hailed
by antitrust practitioners, business groups, and former FTC and DOJ
personnel, it was ultimately sunk by the vehement opposition of Senator
Ernest Hollings, who argued that mergers among media corporations should
be reviewed by the FTC. Senator Hollings, as chairman of the Commerce
Committee, had oversight authority over the FTC, but not over the DOJ
(which fell within the jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
Hollings had one other important pressure point to exploit. He chaired the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that oversees the funding of both the
Justice Department and the FTC, and he threatened to reduce the budgets of
both agencies unless the clearance agreement was abrogated.
Senator Hollings and his staff feared that adoption of the FTC and
DOJ’s clearance agreement would have largely eliminated the flow of
campaign contributions from telecommunication and media corporations to
members of the Senate Commerce Committee, and he apparently concluded
that any new campaign contributions from electric power, health care, and
aerospace firms would not be enough to make up the deficit.131
In the 1970s, FTC management failed to foresee the political
consequences of programs that applied the agencies expansive powers in a
broad manner. The FTC did not anticipate the political feedback generated
by matters that affected significant economic interests. The Commission’s
competition, consumer protection, and economic research programs cut an
astonishingly broad swath through American commerce. Not only did the
Commission take on well-known giants of U.S. industry and, in many cases,
threaten them with remedies such as divestiture and compulsory trademark
licensing, it also attacked sectors that provided the backbone of small and
medium-sized enterprise across the country. This dynamic set in motion
powerful lobbying campaigns before Congress, resulting in strong
legislative backlash. In its selection of measures, the FTC was inattentive
to the political risk associated with each new initiative and to the aggregate
political significance of its sweeping portfolio of programs.
Expansive grants of authority may also serve the electoral needs of
individual legislators.132 Once Congress has delegated an ambitious range
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of regulatory tasks to an agency, individual legislators or committees will
predictably urge the regulatory agency to use its powers aggressively.
Firms affected by the agency’s activities will predictably complain to the
Congress, especially to oversight committees whose members are recipients
of contributions supplied by the regulated industry. Individual members or
committees will predictably demand that the agency temper its intervention.
One can accomplish some of the same objectives by introducing a bill to
regulate the industry, but using a middleman leaves fewer fingerprints.
Such strategies need not be deployed very often; affected firms will make
campaign contributions even if there is not a live controversy, to ensure
they will have access to members when they need it -- meaning that service
on an oversight committee is accompanied by an annuity from the affected
firms.
V. Divide or Conquer?
If a particular competition policy conglomerate is not “working,”
then there are at least two different ways of solving that problem: one can
divide (separating the conglomerate into distinct entities, each of which has
a sole area of policy responsibility), or conquer (turn responsibility for the
conglomerate over to new management, drawn from a different part of the
government.)133 Part III contains multiple examples of such initiatives.
Examples of division include the decision by Congress in 1947 to establish
the Air Force as a separate body by divesting functions previously
performed by the U.S. Army and its Air Corps, the spinning off in the 1974
of the National Transportation Safety Board from the Department of
Transportation, and the repositioning of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission as a distinct institution removed from its former home within
the Atomic Energy Commission. Prominent illustrations of conquest
include the absorption of numerous border protection institutions (such as
the U.S. Coast Guard) into the Department of Homeland Security, the
amalgamation of various financial services regulatory functions into the
Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, and the removal of the Fish and
Wildlife Service from the Departments of Agriculture and its relocation
inside the Department of the Interior.
Experience with competition agencies also features examples of
division and conquest. A major example of division occurred in the 1930s,
when the FTC incubated the securities regulatory functions eventually
Regulation, 16 J. Legal Studies 101 (1987).
133
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transferred to the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Conquest
episodes include the assimilation in 2011 by Ireland’s Competition
Authority of the country’s consumer protection agency. A complex
variation that exhibits elements of both is the pending restructuring of the
United Kingdom’s competition policy system. The existing Office of Fair
Trading and the Competition Commission will be reconstituted as a new
Competition and Markets Authority, with many of the OFT’s consumer
protection functions divested to other government bodies.

Divide
Competition
Agencies

Other Agencies

Conquer

SEC spin-off from Absorption by Ireland
FTC
Competition Agency of
consumer protection
Consumer protection
spin-off from OFT
US Army Air Corps DHS absorption of
recreated as US Air border
protection
Force
agencies
NTSB spun off from CFPB absorption of
DOT
financial services bodies

How should we decide between these two possibilities?
Space precludes a full answer, but a campaign speech by thenCandidate (and later) President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggests
a framework for thinking about the decision, and for answering
which agency (among the many that are available) should do the
conquering.
There are four different kinds of bears in the United
States, and, of course, all these bears come under the
jurisdiction of one Government department or another. I
think it is the brown bear that comes under the jurisdiction of
the Department of the Interior, and I think the black bear
comes under the Department of Agriculture; and the Alaska
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bear comes under the Department of Commerce; and
jurisdiction over the grizzly bear is held by the Department
of War. That has been going on from time immemorial in
Washington. Each bear - the care of the bear and everything
else about the bear -falls under a different department,
depending on the genus of the bear. And I am told
confidentially that sometimes there is a most awful mixup,
because sometimes a black bear falls in love with a brown
bear, and then nobody knows under what department the
puppies belong.134
Consider how each of the four listed “parent” agencies would
behave in response to misconduct by their respective “bear-children” and
“grand-bear-children.” Those same characteristics are likely to inform the
conquering agency’s behavior if they are given responsibility for the
competition agency.
VI.

Conclusion

Why should anyone care about the organization of the agency
charged with implementing competition law? Professor Amy Zegart
concisely answered the first question:
Organization is never neutral. As any Washington taxi
driver can point out, government organization has serious
implications for policy outcomes. . . . When it comes to
selecting, shaping, and implementing. . . policy, the devil
often lies in the details of agency design.135
On the issue of whether the agency should be divided or conquered,
not every problem in competition law and policy requires a “shoot first,
shoot later, and then when everybody's dead try to ask a question or two”
mindset.136 If your competition agency behaves like that, it may be time for
a change.
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